



مكتبة قطر الوطنية QATAR NATIONAL LIBRARY

لقد تم إنشاء هذا الملف بنسخة بي دي إف بتاريخ ٢٠١٧/١٠/٠٥ بواسطة مصادر من الإنترنت كجزء من الأرشفة الرقمي لمكتبة قطر الرقمية. يحتوي السجل على الإنترنت على معلومات إضافية وصور عالية الدقة قابلة للتقريب ومخطوطات. بالإمكان مشاهدتها على الرابط التالي:

http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100000000831.0x000039

المراجع	IOR/R/15/5/110
العنوان	"١/١ المجلد II العلاقات الكويتية السعودية"
التاريخ/ التواريخ	٠٥ يوليو ١٩٣٣-١٣ مارس ١٩٣٥ (ميلادي)
لغة الكتابة	الإنجليزية والعربية في اللاتينية بالأحرف والعربية
الحجم والشكل	مجلد واحد (٢٦١ ورقة)
المؤسسة المالكة	المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند
حق النشر	<u>الملكية العامة</u>


حول هذا السجل



تتعلق المراسلات وأوراق أخرى بالعلاقات بين كل من بريطانيا والكويت والسعودية. يأتي هذا المجلد زمنياً مباشرة بعد "١/١ المجلد II العلاقات الكويتية السعودية" (IOR/R/15/5/109)، وهو يتناول الموضوعات التالية:


- تحركات خالد بن حثلين من قبيلة العجمان.
- الحصار التجاري الذي فرضه ملك السعودية عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن بن فيصل آل سعود على الكويت.
- آراء مسؤولي الحكومة البريطانية بخصوص التزامات بريطانيا تجاه الكويت في ضوء الحصار.
- المفاوضات بين مسؤولين بريطانيين وسعوديين (بما في ذلك وزير الشؤون الخارجية السعودي فؤاد حمزة) الخاصة بحدود السعودية مع جيرانها، والحصار على الكويت، واليمن.


المتراسلون الرئيسيون بالمجلد هم: الوكيل السياسي في الكويت (المقدم هارولد ريتشارد باتريك ديكسون)؛ المقيم السياسي في الخليج العربي (المقدم ترنشارد ويليام كرافن فاوول)؛ الوز البريطاني في جدة (أندرو ريان)، القائم بالأعمال البريطاني في جدة (ألبرت سبينسر كالفرت).


يحتوي المجلد على عدة أوراق باللغة العربية، يرافقها عادة ترجمات باللغة الإنجليزية.


























Telegram

From Resident, Bushire.

To Political, Kuwait.

No. 553.

Dated the 12th July 1933.

→ 2
3


Dated the 12th July 1933.

Addressed Political Agents, Kuwait and Bahrain.

Saudi Government have informed Minister, Jeddah privately that they suspect that Khalid bin Hathlain (Ajman) proposes to enter Nejd from Kuwait with evil intent and is trying to obtain supplies at Kuwait and Bahrain.

Please ascertain whether Khalid or his agents have been trying to buy supplies and obtain assurance from Ruler that all preventive measures will be taken to check any activity of Khalid or his Agents in Kuwait or Bahrain directed against the Saudi Government. Please report result by telegram.

-RESIDENT-





Telegram Cypher.

From Political, Kuwait.

To Resident, Bushire.

No. 158.


Dated the 14th July 1933.


١٥/٢
p. 1
Your telegram of 12th instant, No.553.


See my Summary No.140, dated the 30th June, Section 6.


Individual is I believe now near Kerbela. I can find no evidence that he or his Agents contemplate action as suggested or are purchasing supplies. He came from Baghdad to settle some debts and see friends, with presumably King Faisal's approval. Story looks like invention of one of Bin Sauds agents here. Shaikh readily gave assurance asked for by you.


-POLITICAL-













5

CONFIDENTIAL.

No.807-S. of 1933.

RECEIPT
384
20.7.33
PERSIAN CULT.

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Simla.
2. His Majesty's Minister, Jedda.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document.

British Residency
and Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated....5th July 1933,...

Reference to previous correspondence:


To (1). Bushire Printed letter No.804-S of 5th July 1933.


Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Political Resident's despatch No.49 of 5th July 1933 to His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, London.	KUWAIT BLOCKADE.

No.808-S of 1933.

Copy, with copy of enclosure, forwarded, with compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information.





Confidential.

British Residency & Consulate-General,
Bushire, the 5th July 1933.

No. 49 of 1933.

Sir,

With reference to this Residency Printed letter No. 47, dated the 5th July 1933, enclosing copy of Colonel Dickson's Intelligence Summary for the month ending 30th June 1933, I have the honour to make the following comments.

Kuwait Blockade.

2. Section IV. If Ibn Saud actually intends to, and is in a position to carry out this measure of a "Pearl Fishery Blockade", in addition to his land blockade, it will undoubtedly have the most serious consequences for Kuwait.


3. Section V. Colonel Dickson's comments are interesting, especially paragraphs (d), (e) and (f).


Ibn Saud.


4. Section VI. Khalid al Hathlain's remarks on what would happen on Ibn Saud's death are of interest as probably indicating the hopes and intentions of most of the important tribal leaders in Arabia.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the
Government/

His Majesty's Secretary
of State for the Colonies,
The Colonial Office,
London.









CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 857-S of 1933.

RECEIVED
374
19.7.33
PERSIAN GULF

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Simla,
2. The Political Agent, Kuwait,
3. The Political Agent, Bahrain,

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

British Residency
and Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

ADY & CONSULATE GENERAL
BUSHIRE

Dated....14th July 1933...


Reference to previous correspondence:

- - -

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
1. Telegram No. 144, dated 11th July 1933, from H.M.'s Minister, Jeddah.	
2. Telegram No. 10, dated 13th July 1933, from H.M.'s Secretary of State for the Colonies, London.	Activities of
3. Telegram No. 22, dated 14th July 1933, to H.M.'s Secretary of State for the Colonies, London.	KHALID bin HITHLAIN.

(See previous page)





Telegram XX.

From H.M.'s. Minister, Jedda.

To Political Resident, Bushire, No. 144.

Repeated Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London, No. 134.


H.M.'s. Charge d'Affaires, Baghdad, No. 111


Dated (and received) 11th July 1933.

Saudi Government have communicated to me privately information received by them from a variety of sources that KHALID bin HITHLAIN is proposing to enter NEJD from KUWAIT and with evil intentions and with encouragement of "others" and that he and his party are trying to get supplies at Kuwait and Bahrain. They ask that preventive measures may be taken.

Somewhat similar warning preceded RIFADA affair and mention of "others" may be attempt to implicate King of Iraq. I should like to answer what is possible to dispel idea that if KHALID is in fact up to mischief he can make use of Kuwait or Bahrain.

- Ryan.







Telegram P.
From Secretary of State for the Colonies,
London.
To Political Resident, Bushire. No. 10
Repeated to H.M.'s Minister, Jeddah. No. 88
H.M.'s Ambassador, Baghdad. No. 128
Dated 13th received 14th July 1933.

IMPORTANT.

This warning is very similar to that given by Saudi Government in the case of Ibn Rafada and in that case, warning proved to be correct. Under international law there is general obligation to prevent as far as possible hostile activities being carried on against territories friendly with neighbouring country. All possible precautions should be therefore be taken to prevent any such activities against Nejd, based at Kuwait or Bahrain, and we rely on you to do your utmost to achieve this end.

Foregoing has reference to Jeddah telegram to you, No. 144 of July 10th.
p.b Secretary of State for the Colonies.





Telegram P.

From Political Resident, Bushire.

To H.M.'s. Secretary of State for the Colonies,
London, No. 22.


Repeated H.M.'s. Minister, Jedda, No. 563.


Dated 14th July 1933.

p.7
Your telegram No. 10.

I have telegraphed Political Agents, Kuwait and Bahrain, to obtain assurance from Ruler that all preventive measures against activities of KHALID or his agents will be taken and to ascertain whether attempt is being made to collect supplies.

- RESIDENT.





7-33 12

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 853-S of 1933

391
20.7.33

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

The Political Agent, Kuwait.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (3).



British Residency
and Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.



Dated...12th..July..1933....

Reference to previous correspondence:

Political Resident's Express Letter "b. 779-S of
30th June 1933
Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Political Resident's tele- gram No. 21, dated the 11th July 1933, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, London.	Kuwait Blockade.








Telegram R.
From Political Resident, Bushire.
To Secretary of State for the Colonies,
London. No. 21.
Repeated to H.M.'s Minister, Jedda. No. 545.
Copy by post Foreign Secretary to the Government
of India, Simla.
Dated 11th July 1938.

1. Kuwait Blockade. Following from Political Agent, Kuwait, dated 9th July begins:-
"Saw Shaikh yesterday and discussed alternatives. Shaikh rejected first two but favoured third. He said he was ready to give document to His Majesty's Government surrendering all claims except personal loan provided His Majesty's Government will give him letter undertaking to get blockade raised in the near future and under conditions acceptable to Kuwait which in effect means string of customs posts on frontier." Ends.
2. Third alternative referred to is (c) of record of Interdepartmental Meeting of 28th April.
3. As regards personal loan please see paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 43 of 17th September 1932.

Resident.





W
19-7-33
I (1)
14

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 874-S of 1933.

RECEIPT
390
10-7-33

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

The Political Agent,
Kuwait,

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document ~~for~~ for information.

British Residency
and Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated....15th July..1933...



Reference to previous correspondence:
p. 12



Bushire Printed letter No. 853-S of 12th July 1933.



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
Name and Date.	Subject.
Telegram No. 11 of 14th July 1933 from Secretary of State for the Colonies, London.	KUWAIT BLOCKADE.

P. 15











-2-


16 (17)
prepared to abandon them only in return for further specific
guarantee from His Majesty's Government of settlement of
blockade on his own terms. As you know, we regard Shaikh
himself as responsible for difficulty which has arisen over
claims and which has materially retarded discussion of
blockade, and if matter is not to be pursued with Ibn Saud
only alternative is their complete abandonment (save possibly
personal claims). While we have been, and are, as you
(? can) emphasize, most anxious to give Shaikh all possible
assistance to secure equitable settlement of blockade, it is
impossible for us to give any such undertaking as he asks,
particularly in order to induce him to adopt what in all
the circumstances appears to be the best course in his own
interests, and you should make this clear tactfully.

You should also impress on Shaikh that now
that obstacle to progress over blockade hitherto presented
by claims dispute has been removed by Ibn Saud's spontan-
eous advance, he will be ill-advised to let the opportunity
slip, and that his best tactics will be, as suggested
above, to make some counter-suggestion which should, if
possible, be made to appear a modification of Ibn Saud's
proposal and not merely a rejection of that proposal
accompanied by a re-statement of Shaikh's earlier sugges-
tions which Ibn Saud could take as rebuff and might welcome
as evidence, to which he would point, of Shaikh's
intransigence.

Please inform Jedda by telegram of result
of your forthcoming discussion with Shaikh.

-Secretary of State for the Colonies-





17

C's. P. P.—L (111) 980—300-12-29—C.

No. C/277.

The Political Agent, Bahrain, presents his compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.

THE AGENCY,
BAHRAIN, PERSIAN GULF.

388
20.7.33

The 15th July 1933.

p. 3

Reference to previous correspondence.


Bahrain Telegram No:273 dated 15th July 1933:

DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE.

Name and date.	Subject.
Letter No: C/276 dated the 15th July 1933 from the Political Agent, Bahrain, to the Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.	Khalid bin Muhammad bin Hithlain.

p. 18

B. P. P. POLITICAL AGENT
BAHRAIN





y to Bushire.

y to Kuwait.

Confidential.

No: C/276.

Political Agency,

Bahrain, the 15th July 1933.

From:-

Captain E.H. Gastrell, I.A.,
Political Agent,
Bahrain.

To:-

The Hon'ble the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,
Bushire.

Sir, Khalid bin Muhammad bin Hithlain.


I have the honour to refer to my telegram No: 273
of today's date.


2. On receipt of your telegram No: 553 of the 12th July
1933 I discussed the matter with the Adviser to the
Bahrain Government, who kindly arranged for me to interview
the Ruler the next morning (Friday) at 10 o'clock.


3. Mr. Belgrave, who had been unable to ascertain any
news as to the activities of Khalid or agents, accompanied
me and very kindly acted as Interpreter. His Excellency
the Shaikh knew all about this man, whose father's name is
MUHAMMAD, as he was in Bahrain for a short time some ten
years ago. For the past year or two Khalid has been a guest
of His Majesty King Faisal of 'Iraq at Baghdad. He has no
money, but was the third in order of importance in the Ajman
rebellion.


4. His Excellency did not think he was an active enemy
of the King of Sa'udi Arabia, as his sister had been married
to that King only last year at Mecca. Incidentally the
girl was divorced very soon after as she was "very hot
headed". In fact she told the King that she wouldn't put


(2)














Telegram.

From - Fowle, Kuwait.

To - Secretary of State for Colonies.

No. 160

Dated the 20th July 1933.

Your telegram No. 11. I have discussed matter with Shaikh. I am definitely of opinion that Shaikh should be permitted to send his original reply to Bin Saud forwarded to you under my P.L. No. 144 dated the 27th June. This reply is in no way a rebuff to Bin Saud. On the contrary it accepts a suggestion originally made by Bin Saud himself vide para 3 of Dickson's letter. p. 205

Saudi customs works out about 70% or more not 7.

Fowle.


No. 161

The Agency,

Kuwait the 21st July 1933

Copy forwarded with compliments to the Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf Bushire.

Lt-Colonel,
Political Agent, Kuwait.





7

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 883-S of 1933

404
12.7.33

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Simla.
2. The Political Agent, Kuwait.
3. The Political Agent, Bahrain.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

British Residency
and Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.


Dated.....
16th July 1933


Reference to previous correspondence:


Residency Printed Letter No. 857-S dated 14th July 1933


Description of Enclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
Political Resident's telegram No. 23, dated 16th July 1933, to H.M.'s Secretary of State for the Colonies, London.	Activities of Khalid bin Hithlain.














Telegram. G.T.C.

From - Political, Kuwait.

To - Britconsul, Bushire.


No. 165

Dated the 24th July 1933.

Your telegram No. 526.

Individual arrived 5th June and departed 20th June by car for Zubair whence understand he returned Kerbela by rail. Sole object visit was to settle a debt, see friends and get present from Sheikh. Both Sheikh and Bin Saud's Agent Al Nafisi entirely ridicule idea that visit in any way connected with anti-Bin Saud conspiracy. Latter indignantly told me today that he sent full report to King of Khalid's visit some time ago knowing full well that mischievous persons would attempt to make capital of it. I myself keep constant watch over tribal movements and have no hesitation in saying that story is false and invented probably with object of discrediting Sheikh.

Political.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 923-S of 1933.

1.R.N. 430
2. 8. 37

26

33

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

The Political Agent,
Kuwait,

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s). for information.

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.


Dated..... 27th July 1933


Reference to previous correspondence:
Kuwait telegram No.165 of 24th July 1933.


Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
1. Telegram No.13 of 22nd July 1933 from His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies.	Activities of
2. Political Resident's telegram No.29 of 26th July 1933 to His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies.	Khalid bin Hithlain.

Handwritten: B.S. fee
4.8










Telegram XX.
From Political Resident, Bushire.
To H.M.'s Secretary of State for the Colonies,
London. No. 29.
Repeated to H.M.'s Minister, Jeddah. No. 609.
Dated 26th July 1933.

27
Your telegram of 22nd July, No. 13.

1. Khalid was not in Kuwait or Bahrain at the time and reference to agents meant that no evidence was traceable in either State of activities by other persons on his behalf.

2. Khalid has not been to Bahrain and has not visited Kuwait since his stay there from 5th June to 20 June, vide my despatch No 47 (804-S to Jeddah) of 5th July. Both Shaikh of Kuwait and Nafisi (Ibn Saud's agent in Kuwait) deride the idea that visit was connected with anti- Saudi activities. Latter has informed Political Agent that realising that visit might be misrepresented, he has reported circumstances fully to King.

Resident.





I.R. N° 436
S. 8. '33

29

(32)

W/S S

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 942-S of 1933.

British Residency & Consulate-General,
Bushire, the 31st July, 1933.

To
The Political Agent,
Kuwait.

Memorandum.

p. 21 Vol. II

Reference correspondence ending with your
endorsement No. 161, dated the 21st July 1933, Kuwait
Blockade.

2. Copy of a telegram from the Colonial Office,
No. 17, dated the 29th July 1933, is enclosed. Please
ask His Excellency the Shaikh of Kuwait to despatch to
Ibn Saud letter, draft of which formed enclosure "B" p. 197
Vol. I
to your letter No. 126, dated the 22nd June 1933.


p. 205 Vol. I


Sd. G. Loch,
Lieut.-Colonel,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


ATTESTED.


J. Cronin
for Secretary to the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf.

p.p.









١/١

السادة الميامية
كويت

عدد ١٧٤ فوسري
في ١٤ ربيع الثاني ١٣٥٢

الي

حضرة محمد الشهم صاحب الم
الشيخ سراج الدين الجابر
كي. سي. اي. اي. سي.
حسبك الكويت

بعد النعمة واداء واحبب الا حقرا
امارة التي المعاد
كانت بيني وبين سدا د تكم في
من خصوس الكتاب المرقم ٦٨ و
٧ صفر ١٣٥٢ الموافق ٢٢ ما يو
اندي قبضته سدا د تكم من جلا
الملك عبد العزيز السمود من
(توحيد الكمارك)

لي الشرف ان احمره
انني استلمت كتاب عدد ٩٤٢/
مؤرخ ٢١ جولاى من فحامة رية
الحليج وبه يقول ان حكومة جلا
ترصي بان سدا د تكم ترسلون ا
لجلا لة الملك بن سمود الكتاب
و/٣/١٠٢٦ الذي اعده سدا
للا رسال لما كنتم في البحرين وا
مسالككم عنه فحامة الكرني فولوا
تنظر فيه حكومة جلا لته قبل الا
واقبلوا منا جزيل الاحترام

Confidential
No. 174.

The Agency,
Kuwait, 5th August 1933.

To
H.E. Shaikh Sir Ahmad al-Jabir as-Subah,
K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
Ruler of Kuwait.


After compliments.


With reference to the conversa-
tion which I had this morning with Your
Excellency regarding letter No. 68 dated the
7th Safar 1352 (23rd May 1933) which Your
Excellency received from His Majesty King
Abdul Aziz al Saud regarding "Tawhid al-
Gumrah" .


I have the honour to inform you
that I have today received a letter No. 942-S
dated the 31st July from the Hon'ble the
Political Resident in which he says that
His Majesty's Government have agreed that
Your Excellency should now despatch to His
Majesty King Bin Saud, the letter No. 3/1026.R
which Your Excellency prepared for despatch
whilst you were at Bahrain, and which the
Hon'ble Lt-Colonel Fowle asked should not
be sent until His Majesty's Government had
had time to examine it.

Usual ending.

Lieut-Colonel,
Political Agent, Kuwait.









CONFIDENTIAL.

1. R. N° 464
17. 8-33

33

No. 992-S of 1933.

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Political Agent, Bahrain,
2. The Political Agent, Kuwait, ✓

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document for information.

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.


Dated... 9th August... 1933...

Reference to previous correspondence:
p. 22

Residency Printed letter No. 883-S of 16th July 1933.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Letter No. 218 dated the 16th July 1933 from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Jedda, to the Foreign Office, with enclosures.	Khalid bin Hithlain.
	Free





(Received under Jedda Printed letter
No. 2078/5/81 of 18/7/33).

Copy.

No. 218.
(2077/5/81)

British Legation,
Jedda.
18th July, 1933.


Sir,


With reference to Sir Andrew Ryan's telegram No. 144 of the 11th instant, relative to the reported intention of Khalid ibn Hithlain to enter Nejd from Kuwait, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy in translation of a personal letter, addressed by Fuad Bey Hamza to Sir Andrew on the 8th July, in which the matter was first brought to the attention of the Legation. Sir Andrew subsequently spoke to Fuad Bey on the 11th July, the day before the Sa'udi delegation left for Jerusalem to resume the Transjordan negotiations, and described the action he had at once taken upon receipt of the letter.


2. The Sa'udi Government evidently viewed the movements of Ibn Hithlain with feelings of considerable uneasiness, not unnatural in view of the part played by this young and warlike chief of the 'Ajman and his tribe in the rebellion of 1929, on the 15th July, the eve of his own departure for Jerusalem, His Majesty's Minister received the hurriedly-arranged visit of the official in charge of the Jedda office of the Sa'udi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shaikh Ali Taha, who read in a stage whisper a message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs thanking Sir Andrew for what he had told Fuad Bey on the 11th and begging for further information as soon as it came to hand.


3. Upon the receipt of Bushire telegram No. 23 to the
Colonial/

The Right Honourable,
Sir John Simon, G.C.S.I., K.C.V.O.,
etc., etc., etc.









TRANSLATION.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

15th Rabi-ul-Awwal 1352.

8th July 1933.

15/3.

PERSONAL.


My dear Sir Andrew,

The Government of His Majesty the King has been informed from various sources that Khalid Ibn Hithlain who three years ago was travelling between the territories of 'Iraq and Kuwait immediately after the insurrection of al Duwayah, is now endeavouring to return from Kuwait into the territory of His Majesty the King. It is presumed that his coming has for its purpose evil objects which he is attempting to carry out in accordance with the encouragement of others. It is understood that the man in question and his party are endeavouring to buy their needs and equipment in Kuwait and Bahrain. I therefore wish to communicate this information to Your Excellency, privately, trusting that you could be good enough to take the necessary measures with the authorities concerned, to prevent the occurrence of trouble on the frontier.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) Fuad Hamza.

His Excellency
Sir Andrew Ryan,
K.B.E., C.M.G.,
Jedda.





Copy.
No. 2054/5/79.

URGENT.
PERSONAL.

BRITISH LEGATION,

Jedda.

17th July, 1933.

Your Royal Highness,

With reference to His Excellency Fuad Bey Hamza's personal letter No. 15/3 to Sir Andrew Ryan of the 15th Rabi-ul-Awwal (8th July) last, relative to the movements of Khalid ibn Hithlain, and to their subsequent conversation on this subject on the 15th Rabi'ul Awwal (11th July), Your Royal Highness will already be aware of the immediate steps taken by Sir Andrew to bring this matter to the attention of His Majesty's Government and other authorities concerned.

I am happy to inform Your Royal Highness that I now learn that Khalid ibn Hithlain is understood to be at present near Kerbela and that there are no evidences of any attempt, as His Excellency Fuad Bey would suggest, on the part of emissaries of Khalid ibn Hithlain to assemble supplies in either Kuwait or Bahrain or to engage there in activities against this country.

An assurance has been given by the authorities in Kuwait and Bahrain who have readily agreed to take every precaution to prevent any activity of this nature being directed against Sa'udi Arabia from those territories.


With highest respects,


(Sd.) A.S. CALVERT.

His Royal Highness

The Amir Faisal,

Taif.





(Received under Bushire Printed Letter No.1004-S dated the 11th August 1933 filed in File V/1.)

(Copy in files P.G.13,I/1 and IV/6)

P.28 4173/33


India Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1
14th July 1933.

Dear Giffard,

You will remember asking me a few days ago about the precise status of the Neutral Zone between Najd and Kuwait. I am sorry to have been so long in sending you a reply, but we have been very much pressed here.

2. The status of Kuwait was the subject of considerable discussion in the period before the war. An agreement regarding it was finally reached with Turkey and a Convention signed to give effect to that Agreement on the 29th July 1913. Under this Agreement the territory of Kuwait was recognised as an autonomous caza of the Ottoman Empire; the Ottoman flag was to be flown by the Shaikh who was, however, to have the right to insert a distinctive emblem in the corner; he was to continue to be a Turkish Kaimakan and his successors were to be appointed to a similar position by the Ottoman Government; the full administrative autonomy of the Shaikh was recognised within the territories of Kuwait proper, the limits of which were defined by the red circle on map No.2 appended to P.G.13; within the surrounding area (included within a green line on the map) which was occupied by tribes recognised as dependent on him, he was, as in the past, to continue to levy tribute and to perform the administrative duties of Turkish Kaimakan, and in both

H.P.W. Giffard, Esquire,
Petroleum Department,
Board Of Trade,
Dean Stanley Street,
S.W. 1.





(2)-


39


both regions Turkey undertook to abstain entirely from any interference. This convention though initialled, had not been ratified on the outbreak of the war.


3. The boundaries between Kuwait and Nejd were finally settled at the Qair Conference of November - December, 1922. As stated in paragraph 34 of the Memorandum on Kuwait in P.G.13 "it was recognised that the power of the Shaikh of Kuwait in the desert was much less than it had been at the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1913, and a settlement was finally reached under which the frontier ~~between Nejd and Kuwait~~ as between Nejd and Kuwait starts from the junction of the Wadi-al-Aujah with the Euphrates the west, running thence (leaving Riqai to Nejd) in a straight line to the junction of the 29th parallel of latitude with the red-semi-circle on the map attached to the draft Anglo-Turkish Agreement and reproduced in Map No.2 appended to P.G.13, thence following the red semi-circle to the sea south of Ras-al-Qulaiah. The southern boundary of the recognised territory of Kuwait is defined above. It was simultaneously agreed that the tract of country bounded on the north by the above line, on the west by the Shaqq, on the east by the sea and on the south by a straight line running eastward from the Shaqq in the west through Ain-al-Abd to the sea north of Ras-al-Mishab should be recognised as common to the two states of Nejd and Kuwait, who were to enjoy equal rights in it until such time as a fresh agreement should be arrived at between them regarding it through the good offices of His Majesty's Government".

4. The geographical area of the Kuwait Nejd Neutral Zone is as defined in the preceding paragraph.

AS









L.R. N° 488
25. 8. 33

41

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1069-S of 1933.

28.8

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Political Agent, Bahrain,
2. The Political Agent, Kuwait. ✓

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (71) for information.

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.


Dated.....22nd...August...1933.


Reference to previous correspondence:
p.33


Residency Printed letter No. 992-S of 9th August 1933.


Description of Enclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
Translation of letter No. 25/3/53 dated the 20th July 1933 from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taif, to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Jedda.	Khālid ibn Hithfin.













- 2 -

44

3. In other words the King would appear to frankly offer Kuwait one of two courses:

- (a) To come under his suzerainty once for all and win peace and contentment; or
- (b) To continue being blockaded, and live face to face with ruin, as the eventual prospect.

4. Under the surface there also is a cunning appeal to the Shaikh and the people of Kuwait to remember that family ties are worth more than nationalistic ideas, and that as Nejdīs by blood they should appreciate the situation and not 'kick against the pricks' any longer.

5. Nevertheless on the whole the King's reply is very reasonably worded. He no doubt wishes to put the Shaikh off, for the time being, with 'soft' words, seeing that at the present moment he is apparently busily engaged in preparing for his coming war with Yemen, and naturally wants to make sure that he leaves a friendly Kuwait in his rear.

6. The King's "pious" declaration in the last line of his letter that he will never agree to Kuwait being injured, is typical, and would be amusing, were it not tragic. Although the Shaikh is far too proud to ever own it openly the last 9 years of continual blockade has brought Kuwait very near indeed to her knees. Only persons like myself who live on the spot and are in touch with realities know the true state of affairs.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,


W

Lt.-Colonel,

Political Agent, Kuwait.

٧٢

H.A.





45
Translation of letter No.308, dated the 17th Jamad
Awal 1352 (7.9.33) from H.M.King Abdul Aziz bin Abdul
Rahman as Saud, King of Saudiyeh Arabia, to His Excellency
Shaikh Sir Ahmad al Jabir as Subah, K.C.I.E. C.I.E.,
Ruler of Kuwait.


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
After Compliments,


We have, with the hand of pleasure, received
your kind letter No.R/3/1114, dated 15th Rabi thani 1352,
and note what you write therein. We thank God for your
existence, and are glad to learn that you are keeping in
good health. My Brother! You should know that we were
not insistent on the matter (i.e. of the raising of Kuwait
customs to the level of ours). We made the suggestion for
no other purpose, than to make the countries as one in
small as well as in more important matters, seeing that
their inhabitants were one and of the same stock. We in-
deed do not seek anything but friendly intercourse (Mubadala)
and to ^{only desire} preserve the interests of all. If you agree to our
proposal, we are ready to work it. If, on the other hand,
you find that your interests lie in another direction, or
you think that you may take harm; why, then we will con-
sider your interests, for we will never agree that you
be injured. God will save you.


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





2.

MR. LAITHWAITE suggested that Koweit was at the present moment of more vital importance to His Majesty's Government than it had been at any time since it had bulked so prominently as the terminus of the Baghdad railway before the war. This was the result first of the development of the air route to India and Australia, which had made the Gulf as important imperially from the air standpoint as was the Suez Canal for naval reasons, and secondly owing to the expiration of the mandatory régime in Iraq and the uncertainty of the future relations of His Majesty's Government with that country. So long as Iraq had been under British control, there had been a natural tendency to give it prior consideration and the less important question of Koweit had been kept comparatively in the background. But now that Iraq had attained full independence, the position was changed and Koweit had once again assumed major importance. Geographically, Koweit occupied a key position at the head of the Persian Gulf, and one from which the Gulf could be controlled. In the event of war we could probably safely assume that Koweit would be on our side and her territory would afford us a base of operations of definite value to the use of which, on the assumption in question, no objection could be raised on the ground that we were violating her neutrality. Further, with the development of the Arabian coast air route to the East, Koweit was likely to prove more and more vital as a station on that route, especially if our relations with Iraq should at any time become so strained that we were unable to rely on the use of the Iraqi aerodromes for the purposes of that route.

COLONEL FOWLE/








3.

COLONEL FOWLE suggested that in point of fact it might one day be possible to avoid the use of Iraq altogether and fly direct from Palestine to Koweit, as the range of the aircraft using the Arabian route increased. MR. RENDEL concurred with Mr. Laithwaite's estimate of the position as regards Iraq. In view of recent events in Iraq it was possible that our whole relationship with that country might have to be modified and he considered that both the future of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty and of the position of the Royal Air Force in Iraq must be regarded as doubtful. On the general point at issue, he observed that one of the main points to be borne in mind was the fact that Koweit was not naturally independent from either the geographical or the economic point of view. It was a port without a hinterland, cut off at present by the Iraqi and Saudi frontiers from the territory which it would naturally feed, and at present denied free communication with the country behind it. Moreover, even its present trade might be jeopardised by the development of the Saudi port at Ras Tanura under the auspices of the American oil concessionaires on the Hasa coast. What was even more important was that its fresh-water supply was not derived from its own territory, but had to be imported from Iraq. It was for consideration therefore whether it would in fact be practicable for His Majesty's Government to maintain the independence of Koweit as against its neighbours, at any rate on the present basis of a rather loose and ill-defined dependence on His Majesty's Government.

COLONEL FOWLE/









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
4.

COLONEL FOWLE concurred generally in Mr. Rendel's description of the economic position of the Sheikhdom. He pointed out, however, that Koweit had always been the port of the deserts of northern Arabia, as Bahrain was the port of Central Arabia. In regard to the position of Koweit vis-à-vis of Iraq, he added that beside the influence which Iraq could exert by controlling Koweit's fresh-water supply, it was also powerful enough to bring pressure to bear upon Koweit over, for instance, the question of smuggling.

MR. RENDEL agreed that both Iraq and Saudi Arabia were in a position to exert strong pressure on Koweit. This being so, the rivalry between them over Koweit was likely to increase, unless of course Saudi Arabia disintegrated. The present position of Koweit between these two States was weak and Sir Andrew Ryan's note showed how powerful an attraction Ibn Saud could exert. The question therefore was whether His Majesty's Government would not be well advised to develop and tighten up their own relations with Koweit in order to strengthen its position. It had in fact been suggested that it might be more advantageous to convert our present treaty relationship into a definite protectorate, on, for instance, the analogy of the Hadramaut, which was now regarded as part of the Aden Protectorate but where our treaty relationship with the local rulers and obligations to afford them protection had been if anything looser than those we had towards Koweit. Would not a Protectorate ensure Koweit more effectively against absorption than the present attempt to maintain the Sheikhdom as a kind of political vacuum in the Persian Gulf,

MR. LAITHWAITE drew attention to three points:-

(a)/






5.

(a) At present the obligations of His Majesty's government to Koweit were represented by their undertaking to grant "good offices" in respect of Koweit under the 1907 Agreement, by their promise of 1907 that "the town of Koweit and its boundaries belong to Sheikh Mobarak-us-Saba, Ruler of Koweit, and to his heirs after him" and their undertaking of 3rd November 1914 that Koweit, in the event of a victory over the Turks, would be recognised by us as an independent principality under British protection. They were thus very general in terms, and, in accordance with our normal policy on the Arab littoral, which dated from a period in which it was possible to protect a sea port by action from the sea, but not to afford effective help inland, we had consistently endeavoured to limit our obligations save as regards "good offices" to Koweit town and the immediately adjoining area. Recent experience had, however, shown that in cases of intervention from outside it was in fact necessary to give the Sheikh, at our discretion, and on our own terms, a measure of active assistance up to the limit of his frontiers and with the development of aircraft the problem of inland defence was now less difficult. This was to some extent a strengthening of his strict treaty position, as also possibly an extension of our strict treaty obligations. (See Appendix B)

(b) With regard to the suggested establishment of a Protectorate it was necessary to consider what the reactions of the Sheikh would be, and also what effect the proclamation of a Protectorate might have on the other Arab rulers of the Gulf. It would in any case be wiser not to make an overt proclamation of this nature since both in Bahrain and Qatar and along the Trucial Coast it would probably rouse apprehensions....






6.

apprehensions and might even cause the local Sheikhs to turn away from His Majesty's Government and consider submitting themselves to Persia or to Ibn Saud.

(c) The basis of His Majesty's Government's present treaty relationship with Koweit was unsatisfactory. In the first place it did not rest, as was the case with Bahrain, Muscat and the Trucial Sheikhdoms, on a long series of formal treaties with the Sheikh dating back for over a century or, as in the case of Qatar, on a comprehensive treaty, but was based only on a comparatively brief correspondence exchanged between the Sheikhs and His Majesty's Government since 1899 and on the reciprocal engagements, still presumably binding since they had not been abrogated, entered into in connexion with the lease of Bunder Shweikh in 1907; secondly there were certain gaps, e.g. we had no slavery agreement with Koweit. It might, he suggested, be possible to fill in the gaps left by this correspondence and tighten our control in that way. An example was our recent request to the Sheikh for certain undertakings in regard to air facilities in his Sheikhdom, one result of which would be to concentrate effective control of such facilities, whether military or civil, in the hands of His Majesty's Government. Another instance was the recent proposed amendment of the Koweit Order-in-Council so as to place responsibility for jurisdiction over non-Moslem foreigners in the hands of His Majesty's Government. A gradual tightening of our control of this character, particularly if pursued as a definite policy on all convenient occasions, would, he thought, at once avoid the difficulties involved in establishing a formal protectorate and would make it very much simpler.

COLONEL....






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
COLONEL FOWLE expressed the view that there did not seem to be any intermediate position possible between a treaty relationship with the Sheikh on the present lines and a full Protectorate. The Sheikh would certainly be unwilling to agree to the sheikhdom becoming a formal protectorate, and prima facie he (Colonel Fowle) was not much in favour of it. He agreed, however, that it would be advisable on suitable opportunities, to try to tighten up our control over the Sheikh.

On being questioned whether he did not consider that our restricted position vis-à-vis of the Sheikh in regard to the Koweit oil concession indicated the essential weakness of our treaty position, he replied that our difficulties in that case had been due rather to the special undertakings given to the United States Government in that matter than to any weakness in our normal control over the Sheikh under the treaty engagements. Had we been able, without violating our pledges to the United States Government, to tell the Sheikh that we required him to give the concession to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company he would have done so.

MR. RENDEL drew attention to the fact that in the event of serious misgovernment by the Ruler of Koweit such as prejudicially to affect foreign citizens in Koweit we might find ourselves in a difficult position vis-à-vis the foreign power concerned. MR. LAITHWAITE said that on this point he thought that Bahrain might be regarded as locus classicus. We had for many years put up with a considerable degree of misgovernment by Sheikh Isa. But when conditions at last in our view became intolerable we did not hesitate to intervene and to depose the Sheikh.

There






8.

There were obvious arguments for doing so, for were we not to intervene when misgovernment had reached a certain pitch it would be most difficult for us to justify a refusal to allow foreign governments which might be affected to take steps to protect the interests of their nationals. We did not think that there need be any apprehension in the case of Koweit that we would fail to bring pressure on a Sheikh who was abusing his position, once it became necessary to do so. The case for early intervention would probably be stronger now that the Gulf was so much more in the public eye.

The meeting then went on to consider relations between Ibn Saud and Koweit. SIR ANDREW RYAN stated that he had been impressed by the apparent weakness of His Majesty's Government's position vis-à-vis of Ibn Saud with regard to Koweit. His Majesty's Government were not strongly placed, when it became necessary to warn Ibn Saud to keep his hands off Koweit, since they were committed to maintaining that Koweit was technically an independent State. A case in point had been the Saudi intrusions into Koweit territory referred to in paragraph 3 of his note, when Saudi officials had performed acts of authority within the limits of the Sheikhdom. COLONEL FOWLE pointed out that in fact our treaty engagements did entitle us to prevent foreign Powers from dealing direct with the Sheikh. Ibn Saud had certainly been informed of the special relations existing between the Sheikh and His Majesty's Government. Speaking generally, he added that in fact little trouble was likely to be experienced with foreigners in Koweit, so long as it remained a Beduin town ruled by a Beduin Sheikh and not, like Bahrain, a relatively cosmopolitan commercial centre. If, however, oil were discovered within the Sheikhdom, it was possible that difficulties might arise.

MR. REMDEL





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
9.

MR. RENDEL pointed out that the Arabian air route was likely to develop quickly. If Iraq were to adopt an anti-foreign policy, and Koweit became correspondingly more important as a centre of international traffic, other countries might well wish to take advantage of the facilities there. We might well find many foreign Powers becoming increasingly interested in Koweit. We could not have it both ways, and should sooner or later have to define our position. His Majesty's Government ought, therefore, to orient their policy definitely either towards the greater independence of the Sheikhdom or towards a tightening of their own control.

MR. LAITHWAITE agreed and added that, in his view, our policy should be directed towards a closer control, but that it was undesirable to hasten any overt declaration of full control, such as the establishment of a protectorate would be. Such a declaration might well frighten the Sheikhs of Bahrain and of the Trucial Coast and do more harm than good. The policy to be followed was, therefore, one of occasional minor adjustments, as these became necessary, tending to increase, or at any rate not to relax, our control over the Sheikhdom.

Reverting to the question of Saudi-Koweit relations, SIR ANDREW RYAN drew attention to the toleration extended by His Majesty's Government to direct correspondence on business matters between the Sheikh and Ibn Saud. This, no less than the independence formula, placed us in a weak position in defending Koweit, and the correspondence in question was of such long standing that it was difficult now for us to take the line that Ibn Saud should write to us rather than to the Sheikh. What was desirable was that

we ...






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
10.

we should be able to tell Ibn Saud openly that we were responsible for defending the Sheikh's interests in any given dispute.

MR. LAITHWAITE said that the explanation of the system of direct correspondence between the Sheikh and Ibn Saud was, he thought, that it dated from a time when the latter was not so important a ruler as he had since become and when we had taken the view that it was unnecessary to take too strict a view of correspondence between Sheikh and Sheikh. That position was now changed, and reconsideration seemed desirable. Ibn Saud was well aware both that His Majesty's Government conducted the foreign relations of Koweit and that the Sheikh had undertaken certain obligations towards us. He agreed that it was now necessary to exert stricter control over the correspondence in question and to emphasize our own special position in Koweit vis-à-vis of Ibn Saud more definitely than had been the case while Iraq was still under British control. He suggested that we might: (a) check Ibn Saud when he appeared to be presuming too far with regard to Koweit - a policy which we were in fact now prepared to follow in regard to the Saudi-Koweit blockade, and (b) enforce stricter regulations on the Sheikh in the matter of direct correspondence.

COLONEL FOWLE agreed. Such action would show both the Sheikh and Ibn Saud that we considered the Sheikh to be under our direction. If we did not take some such step as this, we might be in danger of finding ourselves faced with the results of a kind of conspiracy between the Sheikh and Ibn Saud. We ought, therefore, to write to the ...





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11.


the Sheikh in the sense that we noted that his private correspondence with Ibn Saud had assumed an increasing importance and tell him that that correspondence must now cease.

MR. RENDEL concurred. A straightforward control of this nature would be easier to maintain and would prevent a repetition of such incidents as the letter in which Ibn Saud had recently tried to detach the Sheikh of Koweit from his connexion with His Majesty's Government.

SIR A. RYAN also concurred, and drew attention to the success with which Ibn Saud was spreading the idea that he might naturally absorb Koweit and was bound to do so sooner or later. He pointed out that such an idea could never have prevailed to the extent to which it had, if His Majesty's Government had equally definitely made known their own special position with regard to Koweit.

The meeting then discussed what point in the correspondence between the Sheikh and Ibn Saud could most suitably be taken up in connexion with the reprimand which it was proposed to address to both parties.

MR. LAITHWAITE suggested that if it were discovered that the Sheikh had committed himself to Ibn Saud in regard to the grant of an oil concession in the Koweit Neutral Zone, this might be an excellent opportunity for checking him. The question then arose what action could be taken if the United States Government, in dealing with whom His Majesty's Government had consistently emphasized the Sheikh's independence, were to produce communications from him regarding the grant of a concession in the Neutral Zone. It was, however, agreed that His Majesty's Government could demonstrate from the Sheikh's treaty engagements that he had not been entitled to make any such grant without ...








58 (61)
12.
without our knowledge and consent. Eventually it was agreed that the most suitable occasion for the proposed representations to the Sheikh and Ibn Saud would be Ibn Saud's letter suggesting terms for the settlement of the Saudi blockade of Koweit and warning the Sheikh against His Majesty's Government.


At the conclusion of the meeting SIR A. RYAN raised the question of the pressure which might be exerted upon Ibn Saud in regard to the Saudi blockade of Koweit. This blockade had one of two purposes, either to complete the economic strangulation of Koweit and lead to its complete absorption in Saudi Arabia, or else the safeguarding of Saudi economic interests. His Majesty's Government could not possibly allow the first of these alternatives. The question therefore was what real force there was in Ibn Saud's suggestion that his own purely economic interests required the maintenance of the blockade. COLONEL FOWLE suggested that we might well revert to the Sheikh's proposal that Ibn Saud should have customs posts at a given place along but outside the Koweit border, and that this might, if necessary, be coupled with a system of manifests for Koweit-Saudi trade. He gave it as his opinion that even if Ibn Saud were to develop Ras Tanura, possibly with American help, this port was not likely to compete seriously with Koweit, which served quite a different hinterland, nor was there any port between the Koweit area and the Ras Tanura area which could be successfully developed as a rival to Koweit.

COLONEL FOWLE suggested that on his return to the Gulf ...









DIX A.

Note by Sir Andrew Ryan.


14.

Ibn Saud's attitude towards Kuwait.

I have been turning over in my mind for some time the possibility that it may be a definite object of Ibn Saud's policy to reduce Kuwait to a position of dependence on him somewhat similar to that of Asir from 1926 to 1930. This is in the nature of a pure speculation but it is a speculation so interesting that I think it worth while to collect the principal data bearing on it. It must be admitted at the outset that, if Ibn Saud had such an idea in his head, he would realise the need for great caution lest he should indispose His Majesty's Government. His only formal obligation towards the latter is that contained in Article 6 of the Treaty of Jeddah but he understands very well the implications of the words therein "who are in special treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty's Government". On the other hand he has seen His Majesty's Government tolerate direct correspondence on business subjects between him and the Sheikh of Kuwait. He might think that they would not react over strongly if he and the Sheikh confronted them with the fait accompli of a political deal.

2. Apart from the correspondence, of which we have knowledge, there has been other intercourse between the rulers, notably the Sheikh's visit to Riyadh in 1932, the secret messages brought by Ibn Saud's confidential messenger to the Sheikh early this year and the Sheikh's mysterious dashes into Nejd last February, when Colonel Dickson surmised that he had gone to meet some high Saudi personage, possibly Ibn Saud himself.

3. I may interpolate, as a minor indication of Ibn Saud's attitude, a reference to two occasions on which it has been suggested or hinted by his Ministry of Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's





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
15.

Hajesty's Government should not concern themselves with affairs between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. I class them as minor, because this position has never been categorically asserted. The first was when, in reply to a complaint of mine regarding Saudi encroachments on Kuwait territory, which had perturbed His Majesty's Government, the reply was in effect: "Sorry you have been perturbed. You need not have been if the matter had been pursued through Am. Karisi". On another occasion Mud Bey, in rather light conversation, asked me why we concerned ourselves in matters between his Government and Kuwait.

4. The personal relations between the two rulers are peculiar. Ibn Saud grew up at Kuwait and it is sometimes said that he has shown himself ungrateful to his former hosts. It is said by others, I do not know on what precise grounds, that Kubarak treated Ibn Saud very badly. Anyhow, through all the relations there runs a thread of old friendship, however flimsy and however frayed by frequent friction over raids, the embargo and so on. It has helped towards the settlement of minor questions. It has not deterred Ibn Saud from enforcing the embargo on trade but the embargo on trade has not destroyed the Sheikh's ostensible friendliness towards Ibn Saud. They are "Arcades Ambo" as I once wrote and they both combine some real friendship for His Majesty's Government and a healthy fear of them with a good deal of fundamental mistrust.

5. The point of my theory or speculation is that, if the Sheikh of Kuwait were at all willing to be "Asirized", Ibn Saud could make the proposal quite attractive on the following lines, if I may venture to put into his mouth the sort of language he could use:-

(a) "You are not really independent, my dear fellow. You are under the thumb of the English. They might annex you at any





62 (65)


any moment or even present you to Iraq. If you must be ^{16.}
dependent on some one, why be dependent on those untrustworthy
imperialists, when you might depend, without being exactly
dependent, on a man like me, old friend, fellow Moslem, fellow
Arab and the one big independent man in Arabia".


(b) "I don't like squeezing you, I really don't, with that
embargo. As things are at present I have to think of my own
interests. But if your interests were mine, we could easily
have an understanding. A sort of 'Zollverein' as they say:
same duties levied in our ports; free competition between
yours and mine; free trade over our land border. What have
the English done about it? Nothing, because they cannot get
at me. Sois mon frère, et je te fais vivre. Sois le leur,
et je te tue".

(c) "I should not mop you up of course. You would rule
your state under an understanding with me. Indeed, if you
were in with me, I might recognise a sort of influence of
yours over those three Lost Tribes that you always want back.
Look at how I treated the Idrisi. I made a sensible agreement
with him in 1926. He remained a ruler with tribal influence.
I did not take charge in his country, until he got into such
a mess that he asked me to in 1950. I did not hit him on the
head until the poor mutt thought he could try conclusions with
me in 1932. He looked to foreigners and he got it in the neck
from me".

(d) "You have had trouble with Iraq over your property there.
What has England been able or even willing to do for you?
If I had the right to protect you against third parties, you
'would find that I knew how to see you through."

(e) "Then there's oil. People are after it in my country
'and in yours and in the Neutral Zone. Why not have an agreed
"policy







17.
policy and present a common front to the West. You know what the A.P.O.C. is. Another name for the British Government, as we saw in Persia the other day, even if we had not known it before. Take my tip and keep them out at all costs. Play about with Holmes, if you like. But don't trust him and remember that in the long run your best policy would be to deal like me direct with American interests, using the others to put up the price".


6. It is easy enough to detect fallacies in the above imaginary address. I do not know enough about the Sheikh of Koweit to judge what his reaction to it would be but many an Arab, not well pleased with British protectors, might find it convincing enough to be attracted into Ibn Saud's arlour.

7. I wrote the above notes in Jedda at the end of June. I thought them too hypothetical at that time to submit them for official consideration. They may, however, be worthy of some attention now that the Political Resident and I are both in this country and Colonel Dickson will soon be available for consultation. Except that Ibn Saud continues to shew a marked anxiety to avoid all complications, I see no material reason to modify what I wrote nearly three months ago, subject always to the consideration that I merely suggest an uncertain working theory to be tested by further examination and by keeping a close watch on future developments.

August 16th, 1933.









- 2 -


3. The undertakings given in writing to the Sheikh on 3rd November 1914 in return for his cooperation against the Turks contained an assurance that "Koweit shall be recognised as an independent principality under British protection."

B. Construction of the undertakings given to the Sheikh.

4. As will be seen, the engagements entered into by His Majesty's Government with the Sheikh are in rather general terms and it is perhaps desirable briefly to record the construction placed upon them at various times by His Majesty's Government.

5. In 1901, when there was a Turkish threat to Koweit the Viceroy was informed (Secretary of State's telegram No.45 of 4th December 1901, P.1417/01) that this "appears to constitute a distinct violation of the Sultan's promise" (to respect the status quo) "and in these circumstances His Majesty's Government are prepared to support the Sheikh and will not tolerate an attack by Turkish troops or ships upon Koweit. The Sheikh should not leave Koweit and should continue to observe his engagement with us". The assurance given is clearly limited by the words "in these circumstances" to this particular case. Moreover, it is not conditional on and is independent of the Sheikh's observance of his Agreement of 1899.

6. On 21st March 1902 Lord Lansdowne, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a Memorandum on the situation in Koweit remarked that our obligations towards the Sheikh were "as ill-defined as the boundaries of his Principality. We have distinctly announced that he does not enjoy British "protection"; on the other hand we once made him a present of £1,000, and promised him our "good offices" whatever that may mean. When we made this promise we were, I feel no doubt, thinking/






- 3 -

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thinking of Koweit proper, if there is such a thing, and not of Boobyah or other outskirts over which the Sheikh has rights of one sort or another... We might it seems to me explain (1) to the Porte (2) to the Sheikh, and (3) to the foreign Powers immediately interested the objects of our policy. I should be inclined to say that our engagements to Koweit do not extend beyond the district adjoining or close to the bay of that name and to endeavour to obtain the adhesion of the Porte and of the Sheikh to our approximate definition of that district..."

7. Later in 1902 it was reported that Ibn Rashid was making energetic preparation for attacking Ibn Saud, then the Sheikh of Koweit's friend, and the Sheikh was warned not to take any action likely to bring him into difficulties with either Nejd or Turkey. About the same time the Sheikh informed us that Ibn Rashid had with him a gun presented by the Turks and asked for a gift of 2 or 3 guns which it was understood were wanted for Jehara to protect Koweit against land attack. The Viceroy (telegram No.39 of 3rd October 1902) proposed to reply that the Sheikh's request could not be granted, "but that provided he complied with the injunction conveyed to him in pursuance of your telegram of 4th December 1901 (see paragraph 5 above) His Majesty's Government would charge themselves with the defence of Koweit district." The Secretary of State after consultation with the Foreign Office (F.O. letter of 13th October 1902) replied (telegram No.133 of 14th October 1902) "I approve your proposed reply about the guns, provided Koweit district is clearly defined as the district adjoining or close to the bay of that name." This assurance similarly admits of being read as an assurance ad hoc, and it is relevant that when, in April 1911, enquiry was made by the Secretary of State for India of the Government

of/





1. of India whether the definition in question of Koweit territory had been communicated to the Sheikh they replied that it might be assumed that it had, but that it "only referred to our pledge to defend him against Ibn Rashid who was threatening the immediate neighbourhood of Koweit." (telegram of 6th April 1911, P.594/11).


8. The more specific undertakings embodied in the Bunder Shweikh lease of 1907 and quoted in paragraph 2 above may be regarded as to some extent committing us in respect of "the town of Koweit and its boundaries". The phrase "its boundaries" is, however, very vague, and could perhaps most reasonably be construed as applying to the immediate district around Koweit town. The discussions as to our obligations to the Sheikh which took place in 1911 and which are summarised in paragraphs 9 to 12 below,

appear to have turned essentially on the undertakings of 1899. In 1911, in connection with the Anglo-Turkish negotiations, the question of our obligations was examined in some detail.

9. The Government of India, on being asked, with reference to Lord Lansdowne's Memorandum of 1902 to which reference is made in paragraph 6 above, to "define the region to which our obligation extends, and "whether they accepted" general description of boundaries in Persian Gulf Gazetteer, page 1059 etc;" replied "We are of opinion that (1) our obligations extend to the limits of the Sheikh's territory, (2) these limits, to the best of our knowledge, are defined with fair accuracy by Lorimer, especially as regards northern portion..."

10. The Secretary of State for India in the light of the Government of India's views, wrote as follows to the Foreign Office (P.594/11, 8th April 1911):

"Viscount/







"Viscount Morley is not aware on what grounds the opinion expressed by the Marquess of Lansdowne in his memorandum of 21st March 1902 is based, but he observes that the language used is very tentative, and, so far as he knows, the subject was never pursued along the lines suggested by His Lordship, except in the case of the attack on the immediate neighbourhood of Koweit threatened by Ibn Rashid in the autumn of 1902. It will be seen from the Government of India's telegram of 6 April that this incident does not affect their opinion that our general obligations extend to the limits of Koweit territory as described in Vol.II pp.1059-1061 of Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, copy of which is in your possession. In this Lord Morley concurs: that is to say he thinks that in the event of unprovoked aggression by the Turks or by Arab tribes under Turkish control, upon those limits, H.M.G. could not abstain from using their "good offices" in the Sheikh's favour. But the term "good offices" is a very vague one, which H.M.G. are at liberty to interpret at their discretion, and which they would doubtless interpret with more or less strictness according to the nature and locality of the aggression, and all the circumstances of the case. It would, however, in His Lordship's opinion, be very impolitic to attempt, in dealing with the Sheikh, to whittle down the extent of our obligations, since such a course would fill his mind with suspicions and could not fail to affect unfavourably ^{our} prestige in the Persian Gulf...."

- 9/11 11. The F.O.replied on 9 May 1911 that Sir E.Grey concurred "in the view of the Government of India, shared by Viscount Morley, that these obligations extend to the whole territory of the Sheikh as described in the passage of Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf to which your letter refers."

12./






- 6 -

12. In Aug: 1911 the Government of India, after consultation with the Political Resident (Sir P.Cox) recommended that H.M.G. should communicate to the Turks a copy of the Agreement of 1899 with a note that H.M.G. had subsequently informed the Sheikh that so long as he and his heirs and successors acted up to their obligations under the Agreement, we charged ourselves to support them and to protect Koweit against attack by land or sea." The Secretary of State for India, on closer consideration, found himself unable to accept this proposal. India Office letter to the Foreign Office of 30th October, 1911, P.1446/11, remarked: "The telegrams of 4th December 1901 and 14th October 1902, on which the Government of India appear to base the obligation to protect Koweit by land and sea, in the Marquis of Crewe's opinion clearly refer only to the incidents that occasioned them and cannot be understood to have given any general undertaking. Nor, in view of the fact that it has since been decided that our obligations extend to the whole of the Sheikh's territory as described in Lorimer's Gazetteer, would it be safe to pledge ourselves to any specific method of defending them. As was pointed out by Lord Morley in this Office letter of 8th April last, the term "good offices" (which by Colonel Meade's letter of 23rd January 1899 we undertook to accord to the Sheikh) is a conveniently vague one and Lord Crewe is of opinion that it is neither necessary nor safe to go beyond it. The action taken by H.M.G. in 1901/02, when men and guns were landed at Koweit to defend it against unprovoked Turkish aggression, will, moreover, have made it plain to the Porte in what way we are prepared to interpret the term if necessity arises.

"His Lordship would therefore suggest that the formula should run: "As regards No.1, H.M.G. have informed the Sheikh of Koweit that so long as he and his heirs and successors/






- 7 -

successors act up to their obligations under the Agreement, H.M.G. undertake to support them and accord them their good offices," with perhaps the addition that H.M.G. reserve to themselves the right to interpret that term at their discretion." The Foreign Office (F.O. letter dated 1st November 1911) accepted the proposed redraft and addition and a communication in this sense was made to Tewfik Pasha in Sir Edward Gray's letter of 24th October 1911(42135).

13. The undertaking given in 1914 that Koweit "shall be recognised as an independent principality under British protection" may be regarded as importing a degree of responsibility for the protection of the principality as a whole.

14. On the death of Sheikh Mobarak his eldest son was informed in March 1916 on his accession by the Viceroy that "so long as you act up to the existing arrangements with the British Government you may expect the same support as was enjoyed by your father." A similar assurance was given on Sheikh Jabir's death in 1917 to his brother and successor, Sheikh Salim, in March 1917. Sheikh Salim's conduct was unsatisfactory and it was found necessary to warn him, through the Political Resident, on 5th July 1918, that the assurances (which presumably covered the assurance of 3 Nov. 1914) conveyed to him on his accession were conditional on his good behaviour and that should acts "contrary to the interests of (His Majesty's Government" "unfortunately be committed in future" he would be held personally responsible.

15. In connection with the operations against the Ikhwan in 1928 the question of the precise extent of the obligations of H.M.G. for the defence of Koweit was considered in the India Office, when the view was put forward that consideration of our engagements suggested that on a strict reading our liability could be confined to the protection of/






- 8 -

of the town of Koweit and that we are not called upon to protect Koweit territory as a whole.

Conclusion.

16. As will be seen from the correspondence summarised above (a) we appear consistently to have taken the view that our obligations are conditional on the good behaviour of the Sheikh; (b) secondly, subject to this reservation, we are committed to "good offices" in respect of "Koweit", an assurance which has since 1911 been accepted as extending to the whole territory of the Sheikhdom, but which would not commit us to anything further than diplomatic support; (c) thirdly, we have promised "that the town of Koweit and its boundaries" "belong to " the heirs of Sheikh Mobarak; (while the payment of rent for the Bunder Shweikh' site was terminated in 1907, the Agreement of 1907 was not abrogated, and the reciprocal pledges embodied in that Agreement should apparently still be regarded as binding in so far as they are not affected by other subsequent instruments. We communicated Article IX of the Bunder Shweikh Agreement to Ibn Saud in 1928: and in 1933 the P.A.Koweit and the Political Resident brought to notice the continued existence of the obligations of the Sheikh in regard to Customs duties (para. 2 above) under Article X of the Agreement) (d) fourthly, that we have undertaken to recognise, and have in fact recognised, Koweit as an independent principality under British protection. No definition has been given or attempted of the meaning of "British protection" in this connection; and while prima facie the Sheikh might apparently be justified in claiming that it represented an assurance of effective protection in respect of the whole of his principality, there is some room for discussion as to its precise implications, and it is noteworthy that no appeal appears to have been made under it either by the present Sheikh or by his predecessors.

INDIA OFFICE. 11 Oct. 1933. J.G. LAITHWAITE.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1288-S of 1933.

R. I. No. 601
13.10.33

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W
12.10

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London,
2. The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, New Delhi,
3. His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Jeddah,

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

2. The Sheikh's letter No. 1/3/1114, dated the 7th August 1933, quoted in the first paragraph of Colonel Dickson's letter, is the one, despatch of which was authorised in Colonial Office telegram referred to below.

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.


Dated 21st October 1933.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Telegram No. 17, dated 29th July 1933, from His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, London.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Letter No. 228, dated the 27th September 1933, from the Political Agent, Kuwait, with enclosure.	KUWAIT BLOCKADE.
Copy forwarded, with compliments, for information to the Political Agent, Kuwait.	Free V



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 305.

POLITICAL AGENCY,

KUWAIT.

Dated 20th December 1933.

From

Lt.-Colonel H.R.P.Dickson, C.I.E., I.A.,

Political Agent, Kuwait:

To

The Hon'ble the Political Resident

in the Persian Gulf, B u s h i r e .

Bin Saud Affairs.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward, for your information, translation of two letters, which His Excellency the Shaikh received from His Majesty King Abdul Aziz al Saud

on 19th November 1933 and

on 1st December 1933,

respectively.

2. As the letter contained no news worth mentioning, and as I had much other local work to get through, more especially in connection with the Shaikh of Bahrain's visit and the report on the "Sweet Water" question in the Shatt-al Arab estuary (See my No.298, dated the 16th December 1933), I did not forward the King's letters to your earlier.


I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Lt.-Colonel,

7. Political Agent, Kuwait





74
Translation of letter No.481, dated the 18th Rajab 1352 (7.11.33.), from His Majesty King Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal, King of Saudi Arabia, to His Excellency Shaikh Sir Ahmad Al Jabir as Sabah, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Ruler of Kuwait.


After Compliments,


It is a long time since we have not had any letters from you; we hope that the cause of delay means nothing. We really get anxious when we do not receive letters from you regularly. May God grant that we hear from you and about you good news at all times.

Seeing that certain people are leaving for your side, we have seized the opportunity of sending this letter by them, by way of keeping touch. By the grace of God, we ourselves are in the best of health and happiness, and news from our territories is pleasing in everyway. We thank God for the many kind favours that He has graciously bestowed upon us, and pray to Him to continue his blessings on us, and help us to thank Him for the same.

As regards our question with Yemen, it stands as we already explained to you formerly. May God destine what is good and advantageous for Islam and Muslims.

Usual Ending.






Translation of letter No.519, dated the 1st Sha'ban 1352 (19.11.33.), from His Majesty King Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal, King of Saudi Arabia, to His Excellency Shaikh Sir Ahmad al Jabir as Subah, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Ruler of Kuwait.


After Compliments,

We forwarded a letter to you before this in which we informed you of what was necessary; we trust that you have received same and were pleased to note its contents.

Seeing that the bearer is proceeding to your side, we have seized the opportunity of sending this letter by him for the sake of regularity. We thank God for the many kind favours that He has graciously bestowed upon us, and pray to Him to keep them continued and enable us to thank Him for the same.

Usual Ending.





(Received under Bushire Printed letter 1365-S, dated the 25th October, 1933).
(Original on file IV/9 "Anglo-Kuwait Relations")

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1365-S of 1933

British Residency & Consulate-General

Bushire, the 25th Oct. 1933.


Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your letter No.P.Z. 6555/33, dated the 13th October 1933, enclosing a copy of the record of an Interdepartmental meeting held at the Foreign Office on 5th instant, Note by Sir Andrew Ryan on Ibn Saud's attitude towards Kuwait, and India Office Provisional Note, dated the 11th October 1933, on the obligations of H.M.'s Government towards the Shaikh of Kuwait I discussed the matter with the Political Agent, Kuwait, when I passed through there recently on my way to Bushire.

2. One of the two questions (the other is dealt with below in paragraphs 7 and 8) discussed at the meeting was briefly whether, with a view to maintaining our control over Kuwait which was undoubtedly fast increasing in importance as a Political and strategical centre in the Middle East, (a) it was advisable to declare a British protectorate over that Shaikhdom, or (b) whether sufficient control could not be obtained over the Shaikh as opportunity offered by filling in the gaps which at present existed in our agreements with him.

3. As will be seen from the record, prima facie I favoured (b) rather than (a), and further reflection and my discussion with Colonel Dickson, who agrees with me, has confirmed me in that opinion. The objections to (a) are that, in our - (i.e. Colonel Dickson and my), opinion a protectorate would most probably meet with considerable opposition from the Shaikh, who while valuing his British connection values equally highly his independence in the eyes of his fellow

His Majesty's Secretary of State for India,
The India Office, LONDON.






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(80)

fellow Arab rulers, and the outside world in general. The declaration of such a protectorate would likewise alarm the other Shaikhs on the Arab Coast of the Gulf. It might also involve His Majesty's Government in a measure of interference in the internal affairs of Kuwait which can at present be avoided. The question of slavery in Kuwait, for example, as part of the Slavery question in the Gulf generally, will doubtless be raised in the future by the recently established Permanent Slavery Committee of the League of Nations, and as we have no Slave Agreement with the Ruler, such as exists with the other Arab rulers by which the local Political Agent can manumit slaves, the Kuwait aspect of this problem offers special difficulties. So long as Kuwait remains independent His Majesty's Government's responsibility in the matter is presumably limited to representation and persuasions to the Shaikh. In the event, however, of a British protectorate being declared over the Shaikhdom, His Majesty's Government might possibly be committed to more drastic action. Finally it is not improbable, though this is a matter outside my sphere, that the declaration of a Kuwait protectorate might lead to somewhat awkward accusations from other governments of 'land grabbing' and the like, with which we have been familiar enough in the past with regard to other areas.

4. An examination of the alternative policy (b) shows that, unsatisfactory as our present/treaty relationship with the Shaikh may be, (as was pointed out at the meeting), we have a certain control over the Ruler, (see India Office Note - Obligations of His Majesty's Government toward-s the Shaikh of Kuwait), and where our Agreements show gaps, these can to a large extent be filled up. Thus control of aviation through Kuwait, whether military or civil, would be in the hands of His Majesty's Government under the proposed Air Agreement (vide correspondence ending with Government of India, Foreign and Political Department Express letter No.F.364-N/33, dated the 21st August 1933, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India) would place jurisdiction over non-Moslem foreigners in Kuwait in the hands of the Political Agent.

5. A third 'gap' is the habit of direct correspondence





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
correspondence which has grown up between the Shaikh and Ibn Saud, and which was dealt with at some length at the meeting. The outcome of my discussion with Colonel Dickson on this point is as follows. There would appear to be two ways in which we can ensure control over this correspondence.

(1) By informing the Shaikh that before despatching any official communication to Ibn Saud he should show it to the Political Agent, and should take similar action with communications received from Ibn Saud. This has been the Shaikh's custom in the past, at any rate in regard to his outward correspondence, whether he has shown all Ibn Saud's official letters to Colonel Dickson we do not, of course, know. After the Shaikh had received our communication, which would, of course, be tactfully worded and would merely ask him to continue the practice which he already observed, he would not be able to quote officially any letters which he had not shown to the Political Agent. If for instance, in order to present His Majesty's Government with a fait accompli on some point agreed upon between Ibn Saud and himself, he should produce a communication which had not been seen by the Political Agent, we could ignore it.

Both Colonel^{Dickson} and I think that perhaps it would be better in our communication not to refer to any particular correspondence but to treat the matter on general grounds.

The above refers, of course, to official correspondence: nothing we can do will prevent 'private and personal' letters passing between the two potentates.

(2) The second alternative is to insist that official correspondence between the Shaikh and Ibn Saud should pass through His Majesty's Government's local representatives: the Minister at Jedda, and the Political Agent, Kuwait (or perhaps the Resident, Persian Gulf). This is already the procedure in force (at the Shaikh's own request) in regard to the Shaikh's correspondence with the 'Iraq Government, and so no new departure in principle would be involved. The advantage of this alternative would be its emphasis to Ibn Saud of the






- 4 -

of the special relations that Kuwait has with His Majesty's Government, which emphasis is apparently particularly needed at the present juncture. (Vide Conclusion of the Meeting). As against this advantage Colonel Dickson is of the opinion that the Shaikh, who regards Ibn Saud, in spite of the latter's treatment of Kuwait, in a somewhat different light to 'Iraq, might object more or less strongly to the proposal.

6. Considering all the circumstances I would suggest that I be authorised to instruct Colonel Dickson to approach the Shaikh verbally on the following lines. That His Majesty's Government have had it recently brought to their notice that Ibn Saud apparently harbours designs of trying to reduce Kuwait to a position of dependence on him, similar - for instance - to that of Asir; that it is possible that the practice of direct correspondence between him - the Shaikh - and Ibn Saud which has grown up of late, even though he - the Shaikh - shows the correspondence to the Political Agent, has somewhat obscured in the eyes of Ibn Saud the fact of Kuwait's special relations of protection, etc. with His Majesty's Government; that it would put this correspondence on a safer and more regular footing, if it was conducted as was the correspondence with the 'Iraq Government, i.e. through His Majesty's Government's local representatives; that in addition an intimation to this effect to Ibn Saud would bring sharply to his notice Kuwait's relations with His Majesty's Government; and that finally His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn confidentially and informally what were his - the Shaikh's - reactions to the proposal.

I trust I may be authorised to take this step as soon as possible and when the Shaikh's attitude has become known I will make recommendations as to which alternative should be adopted.

7. The other question discussed at the meeting, (referred to at the beginning of paragraph 2 above), was the exact extent of His Majesty's Government's obligations to protect the interests of Kuwait. The most important of these obligations





- 5 -

obligations, which are dealt with in the India Office Note on the subject, and the one which in a sense determines any others there may be, is that of protection against hostile incursions or invasions. His Majesty's Government's Agreements with the Shaikh are three in number:

That of January 1899


that of October 1907

that of November 1914.

8. The Agreement of 1899, as far as 'protection' is concerned, in return for the good behaviour of the Shaikh and his successors, merely promised the "good offices" of His Majesty's Government, "whatever that may mean" as Lord Landsdowne later remarked. Our construction of this Agreement appears to have been the convenient one that we could choose the circumstances in which we need, or need not, protect Kuwait in any particular crisis that arose, the exact area which we were responsible for defending being left more or less vague.

9. The Agreement of 1907 merely confirmed from His Majesty's Government that "the town of Kuwait and its boundaries" belonged to the Shaikh of that day and his successors. This Agreement in no way added, in principle, to our nebulous responsibilities for the defence of Kuwait, though possibly read with that of 1899 it might increase these responsibilities up to the 'boundaries'

10. The 1914 Agreement states that in return for the Shaikh's co-operation against the Turks "Kuwait shall be recognized as an independent principality under British protection". This, unlike the phraseology of the previous Agreement, is a most categorical assurance, and the word 'principality' and not 'town' being used, would seem definitely to place the responsibility of protecting the whole of the Kuwait Shaikhdom on His Majesty's Government. Personally I cannot agree with the view quoted in paragraph 15 of the India Office Note that "one strict reading our liability could be confined to the protection of the town of Kuwait and that we





- 6 -

81. 82
(84)

we are not called upon to protect Kuwait as a whole". It is true, as pointed out in the Note (paragraph 17(d), that neither the present Shaikh, nor his predecessors, appear to have appeared under this Agreement to His Majesty's Government, but that hardly relieves us from our obligations. This does not imply, of course, that His Majesty's Government's obligations relieve the Shaikh completely of the responsibility of his own defence. The Shaikh should certainly be able to deal with any small raids across his frontiers, and should only look for assistance from His Majesty's Government in the case of more serious incursions. This in fact was presumably the attitude taken up after the Akhwan operations of 1928 when the Shaikh was encouraged to purchase half a dozen Ford vanettes, Lewis guns which were mounted in the vanettes, and ammunition, and when some of his men received training from the Royal Air Force as machine gunners.

11. In conclusion I venture to suggest that this question, the exact extent of the obligations of His Majesty's Government for the protection of Kuwait, be investigated with a view to a definite decision on the subject. The question is an important one, and the advantages of having a clear conception of what our responsibilities may be in time of crisis, before such a crisis arises, are obvious.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India and His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.

I have the honour to be,


Sir,

Your most obedient,
humble servant,

Sd. T.C.Fowle,

Lt.-Colonel,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf





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(8)

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1917-S of 1933. *R.I. No. 736*
26.12.33

W 19.12

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

The Political Agent,
Kuwait,

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s):

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated 15th December 1933.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Residency Printed letter No. 1366-S of 25th October 1933.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Foreign Office letter No. (E 7141/16/91) dated the 25th November 1933 to the India Office.	Saudi-Kuwait Relations.


W


Copy of this letter as well as a copy of Residency letter No 1366 S of 25 Oct 1933 should be placed in file T (1) Relations between Saudi Arabia & Kuwait, as well as in file IV (9) W 3.1.34

Submitted to H.H. 3.1.34

File 3.1.34

Done on 5.1.34 H.H. 5.1.34





(Received under India Office Printed Letter No.
P.Z.7683/1933).

Copy.

(E 7141/16/91).

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

25th November 1933.

My dear Gilbert,

With reference to our telephone conversation yesterday, I write to confirm what I said to you about Ryan's views on the proposed instructions to Dickson which are outlined in paragraph 6 of Fowle's official letter No.1365-S of the 25th October regarding Saudi-Kuwait relations.


On a cursory reading of that letter, Ryan concurred generally in the proposed instructions, except for the opening clause which states that Ibn Saud intends to reduce Kuwait to the same sort of position as Asir. In Ryan's view it is undesirable to say anything to the Shaikh in the sense of that clause as it might conceivably come to the ears of Ibn Saud, whether through the Shaikh or indirectly, with unfortunate effect on our relations with him. Ryan therefore suggests that this sentence should be omitted from the instructions.


I send you this simply as a record of Ryan's remarks to me: I gather that he spoke to you in the same sense. Fowle's letter has not yet been considered by my higher authorities.


Yours sincerely,


(sd.) Kenneth Johnstone.

J.G. Laithwaite Esquire.









- 2 -

The occurrence took place during a truce when full peace negotiations were proceeding and after Bin Saud had issued most stringent orders to all his generals that no aggressive move whatever was to be undertaken.

As a result of the incident the Imam Yahya at once broke off all peace conversations, and ordered his armies to hold themselves in readiness for an immediate offensive.

Bin Saud had at once dismissed Saayid bin Faisal and had telegraphically disowned the attack and expressed regrets, but the Imam Yahya had refused to accept his explanations.

A couple of days before the messenger left Riath, Bin Saud believing war to be eminent, had sent his son the Emir Saud post haste to Ebha to take supreme command of the Sa'udi armies in Asir. With him had gone all available troops in Riath (800 men) in 80 light lorries under the following members of the Royal Family:

Khalid bin Mohamed as Saud


Fahad bin Sa'ad al Saud.


6. His Excellency the Shaikh when telling me the above story stated that hitherto he had not believed there would be any war, but in view of his man's story he feared only a miracle could avert hostilities now.


What made him more pessimistic was the fact that he had received by the Air Mail of 19th January, a letter dated the 10th from a Kuwait subject in Aden to the effect that Yahya appeared entirely bent on war and had concentrated all available troops on the Asir front and was sending large quantities of arms and ammunition to the tribes of Asir.


7. While I think it somewhat early to accept the story of the Shaikh's messenger, I nevertheless fear there may be considerable truth in his report. The change in the attitude of the Shaikh is in itself disturbing. In the past

he/










Translation of a letter No.621, dated the
22nd Ramadhan 1352 (8.1.34), from His Majesty King
Abdul Aziz bin Saud to His Excellency the Shaikh of Kuwait.

After Compliments,

With the hand of pleasure we have received your
esteemed letter No.R 3/1381, dated the 2nd Ramadhan 1352
(19.12.33) and noted the contents with many thanks for
your congratulating us for the felicitous month of
Ramadhan. May God grant that you and we both be amongst
those who acquire the merit for fasting and devotions, and
that both of us may enjoy His blessings for many years
with happiness and prosperity.

By the grace of God, we are in healthy and com-
fortable circumstances, and news from our territories is
pleasing in every way. Thanks be to God for the many
kind favours He has graciously conferred upon us.

Please continue writing to us, informing us of
your health and of anything you may require.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 121-S of 1934. R.I. No. 112 19.2.34.

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. His Majesty's Minister, Jedda.
2. His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.
3. The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, New Delhi.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (A)

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated 5th February 1934.


Reference to previous correspondence :


Description of Enclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
Letter No. G-32 dated the 28th January 1934 from the Political Agent, Kuwait, with enclosure.	SAUDI - YEMENI DISPUTES.

Copy forwarded, with compliments, to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information. ✓

See









CONFIDENTIAL.

No. C-83.

POLITICAL AGENCY,

KUWAIT.

Dated the 1st March 1934.

From

Lt.-Colonel H.R.P. Dickson, C.I.E., I.A.,
Political Agent, Kuwait;

To

The Hon'ble the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf, B u s h i r e .

Letters from H.M. King Bin Saud.

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 82, dated the 1st March 1934, I have the honour to enclose translations of the following letters which were brought by K.B. Abdul Latif bin Abdul Jalil by car from Riath on Tuesday evening. (27.2.34):



- (a) Personal Letter No. 50/1/9, dated the 6th Dhil Qa'dah (22.2.34) from H.M. King Abdul Aziz to myself;
- (b) Letter No. 744, dated 9th Dhil Qa'dah 1353 (24.2.34) from H.M. King Abdul Aziz to H.E. the Shaikh, together with a very confidential "Mulhaq" or enclosure.

2. As regards the King's letter to me, I propose replying as I do on such occasions giving news of my health etc. and local matters of interest etc.

3. As regards the King's "Mulhaq" to the Shaikh giving latest Yemen news: This was of sufficient interest to cause His Excellency the Shaikh to pay me a special visit.

4. The latter said that, reading between the lines, as he could do being an Arab, better than I could, he saw that matters in Asir were clearly fast approaching a crisis for the following reasons:

- (a) The Imam Yahya was clearly out to waste time and give Bin Saud "smooth" words outwardly, but all the time he was continuing his underground hostile activities (such as encouraging the Asir tribes to rise and cut communications etc. etc.)
- (b) Yahya's obvious intention was to pin the Saudi forces to the Asir country until the hot weather came on, when the King would be forced to give way to all his demands or fight at a serious





- 2 -

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74

serious disadvantage.

- (c) Yahya knew that Bin Saud was only keeping his Asir army supplied with food by superhuman efforts and that money and supplies must fail, if he procrastinated long enough.
- (d) Bin Saud's army was pressing the King's daily either to attack or abandon Asir for the leaders recognized that inaction was weakening them, and playing into the hands of Yahya.
- (e) Bin Saud saw all this clearly too, but dare not risk a pitched battle.

5. Taking all the above into consideration, His Excellency was of opinion that the crisis was near now, but was still of opinion (expressed at the commencement of the Yemen trouble), that there would no war, and that a settlement would be arrived at.

6. The crux of the situation now lay, said the Shaikh, in the IDRISI, Yahya wanted Bin Saud to give the Idri si a small slice of Asir to reside in under his (Yahya's) guarantee of good behaviour while Bin Saud wanted

- (a) either the surrender unconditionally of the Idri si or that Yahya should keep him (Idri si) under surveillance in some town in the interior of Yemen, he (Bin Saud) paying him a salary;
- (b) that Yahya should pay Bin Saud the total cost of maintaining his army in the field, calculated at approximately 10/-S. a day per man from the day the trouble began.

7. The above conditions were brought to His Excellency by K.B.Abdul Latif bin Abdul Jalil, who got them from the King at Riath.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,


Your most obedient servant,


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
Lt.-Colonel,


Political Agent, Kuwait.


7c H.H.














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Translation of very confidential Mulhaq to letter No.744, dated the 9th Dhil Qa'dah 1352 (24.2.34), from His Majesty King Abdul Aziz bin Saud to His Excellency the Shaikh of Kuwait.

Dear Brother! I have been informed by our mutual friend, Abdul Latif bin Abdul Jalil, that you are very anxious to know the news of Yemen. We would have told you everything before regarding the Ruler and Master of Yemen, but his is a difficult and wonderful case. One cannot express all one would like to say about ^{his} copious "talkings", everything he says is clever indeed, also his promises are many. But his underground activities and heart generally are utterly treacherous. We, on the other hand, are doing our best to smooth things over and trust God may make conditions better, because we do not wish for War at all, but much prefer peace and tranquility. It has now been ordained that the Imam Yahya has been constrained to send a mission to our side under one, Ibn al Wazir by name. From the mission's preliminary talk we would appear to be very far indeed from peace, and only God knows how the matter will end. We, for our part, will strain every nerve to arrange what is good for the Muslims. We know however that you fully know the methods and cunning ways of the "Gentleman" we are dealing with, nor is it obscure to others. May God grant better circumstances and lead us to do everything good.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 294-S of 1934.

R.I. No. 208
19.3.34

95
(98)

W
17.3.34

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.
2. The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, New Delhi.
3. His Majesty's Minister, Jeddah.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated 5th March 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence:


To (3) only. Political Resident's telegram No. 276 of 5th March 1934.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Letter No. C-83 dated the 1st March 1934 from the Political Agent, Kuwait, with enclosures.	Letters from H.M. King BIN SAUD.

Copy forwarded, with compliments, to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information.

File





(سرى - خصوصي)

الكويت في ٢٨ ذى القعدة ١٣٥٢ .

حضرة صاحب الجلالة الصديق المحترم عبد المزمع بن عبد الرحمن
آل فيصل آل سعود
ملك المملكة العربية السعودية لا زالت أيام
دائمه


يا صاحب الجلالة . -


نشرفت ب ورود كتابكم الكريم المؤرخ في ٦ ذى القعدة
١٣٥٢ - وصلني في ١٥ ذى القعدة بيد الخان بهادر عبد اللطيف
بن عبد الجليل .

اما تفصل جلالتم بالسلامة عن صحتي وعن احوالي العام
فقد كان له من الاثر اكثر مما يمكنني التعبير عنه وقد مرهني ان
جلالتم - كما عرف عنكم في عدة مناسبات من قبل - لن تنصرون
صديقكم القديم وان الوفاء مجسما في شخص جلالتم .

اما صحتي فله الحمد لا زالت كاحسن ما يكون وكذا لك
صحة زوجتي والاطفال ولا شك في ان ذلك مما يسر جلالتم .

ان عائلتي رجعت من انكلترا في الشهر العاشر - اي
الخاتون التي مصيها المرب - ام سعود - مع بنتي زهره . اما
ابني فقد تخلف في المدرسة في انكلترا . ان ذلك في صالحه
وساعد على ان يحصل منه رجلا انشاؤه الله . انه يبلغ الحادية
عشره في هذا المصيف . ان رجوع عائلتي سرني كثيرا حيث انه ليس
- ٢ -





- ٢ -

من السهل ان يحبس الرجل بدون زوجة تنظم حياته .


انني اوهل ان اذهب الي انكلترا في اواخر ربيع الاول
القادم باجازة ثلاثة اشهر ونصف وذلك للاستراحة من اشغالني
ولمشاهدة ابني . ولا بد من زيارة وزير جلالتهكم المجلس سعادة
الشيخ حافظ وهدية صداقتنا معه - انا والمائلة - وثيقة جسد
وسيقوم مقامني الصجر واتس من هو شهر مدة غيابي .


وما هو سفتي للشاهه ابني سائقه بعد ستين من تاريخ
اي في شهر فبراير ١٩٦٦ لاني سابلغ حلفه من الحامسة والحمد
المقررة من قبل الحكومة .

ان فكرة ترك العمل بين العرب الذين تمكن منهم من ا
قد بدأت تصالفتني من الآن . ولربما اشتركت بيها في الكويت قبل
التقاعد لكي ارجع من انكلترا واسكن هنا بعد عمل ما يجب للمستق
اطفالي . اما المسز دكمن فهي مثلي تفعل الاقامة بين العرب عا
الاقامة في انكلترا بين قوم لا تعرفهم ولا تشترك معهم بالمواطف .

اما اخوكم الشيخ احمد فسلقاتي معه كاحسن ما يمكن
وتمن اشبه باخوين كبير وصغير منا وكلاهما سها وحاكما . وا
انه الان يصر ان ليس له ناصح وصديق احسن مني . وبعد فاه
ولو كنت مثالا للحكومة في الكويت فذلك لا يمنعتني من ان اسجل هو
شخصه لحاكمها .

- ٣ -





- ٢ -

٩٨
١٠١

ان من دواعي اسفي الشديد هو اني
رغم كوني هنا مدة اربع سنوات ونصف لم انتج في إيجاد حل مرضي
لمشاكل الكمارك والحصار الموجودة بين جلالكم والكويت مما اوجب
لي غاية الاسف حيث ان مودتي الشعميه لجلالكم لا تزال كما كانت
في اي وقت . واني واثق من ان بينكم وبين الشيخ احمد مسودة
كانت ولا تزال متناعيه . وفي الحقيقه كما صرحتم لجلالكم مسرارا
لا يوجد فرق بين اهل الكويت واهل نجد ومصلح ال سعود وال
صالح مقرونة الواحده بالآخرى حتى لو ان احدى الحكومتين ترى
شقيقتها في مشكله لا شك عندي في انها تسارع لمده المساعدة لها
وعلى كل حال لعلاقة الدم هي من اقوى الروابط .


ان الخبر بان الاحوال في نجد في تقدم مستقر اوجب لي مزما
المسروور . احمل الله ان يقدّر عن قريب حلا طيبا لجميع
مشكله كل جلالكم في اليمن ايضا لانه لا يمكن تصور تشويح حرب
بين السريه وكلهم اخوة مسلمين .

انا و العائله جميعا تقدم لجلالكم تائق احتراماتنا و تحياتنا
الوديه و الهاري محفظكم .

محكم

كما

الكرنل ا . آر . بي . دكسمن





Personal and Confidential.

From

Lieutenant-Colonel H.R.P. Dickson, C.I.E.,
Political Agent, Kuwait.

To

His Majesty Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al-
Faisal as-Sa'ud etc.,

Your Majesty,


I have the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's very gracious and kind letter dated the 6th Dhil Qa'dah 1352, which duly reached me by the hand of Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif bin Abdul Jalil on 1st March 1934 (15th Dhil Qa'dah 1352).

Your Majesty's very gracious enquiries after my health and other matters of ^apersonal nature, touched me more than I can say and once again proves to me, as you have shown on many occasions before, that Your Majesty does not forget an old friend; and that Your Majesty is the personification of "al wafah".

As regards my health, thanks be to God it continues to be of the best, as also does that of my wife and children. This I know will give Your Majesty satisfaction to hear.

My family returned from England last month, that is to say the Khatoon whom the Arabs call Um Sa'ud together with my daughter Zahra. My son remained behind at School in England; this will be for his good, and will help to make a man of him please God. He will be eleven years old this summer.

The return of my family naturally gave me much satisfaction, as it is difficult for a man to live without a woman to look after his house.





- 2 -

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27

I hope myself to go to England about the middle of June next (early in the Rabi' Auwal 1353) on 3½ months leave: both in order to take a short rest from my work and to see my son. I shall not fail to call on Your Majesty's trusty Minister His Excellency Shaikh Hafidh Wahba, with whom both I and my family are on the friendliest of terms.

Major Watts from Bushire will probably act for me during my absence.

It is a matter of very great regret to me that I shall be retiring in two years from now, that is in February 1936 - as I shall then reach the age of 55 fixed by Government.

The prospect of having to give up work among the Arabs for whom I bear such a deep affection, naturally causes me concern already.


I shall probably buy a house in Kuwait before I finally retire, so as to be able to come back again from England, and settle down here, after arranging for my children's future. Mrs. Dickson like myself would prefer to live among the Arabs than settle down in England among people we do not know, and have no sympathies for.

As regards your brother Shaikh Ahmad, my relations with him continue to be of the best, indeed he and I are more like elder and younger brothers, than Political Agent and Ruler. I think he realizes now that he has no better adviser and friend than myself. After all though I am the Government's representative in Kuwait, that does not prevent me from having a personal affection for its ruler.

It continues to be a matter of the greatest regret to me that I have ^{been here} 4½ years and have not yet succeeded in bringing about a satisfactory settlement of the Customs and Blockade difficulties which exist between Your Majesty and Kuwait.

This

- 3 -





- 3 -

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(104)



This causes me the greatest regret as my personal regard for Your Majesty remains exactly the same as it ever was, and I know that between You and Ahmad there has always been and continues to be a deep affection. In very truth as Your Majesty has often said, there is no difference between the people of Kuwait and the people of Nejd and the interests of the Al Sa'ud and the Al Subah are so bound up with each other that should one state ever see the other in difficulty, I know that the other would come to its assistance at once. After all blood is thicker than water.


The news that matters in Nejd are progressing favourably gives me great satisfaction. I pray that God will shortly bring about a peaceful solution of all Your Majesty's difficulties in Yeman also, for it is unthinkable that war should break out between Arabs and brother Muslims.


Both I and my family send Your Majesty our deep respects and affectionate salutations.


Usual ending.


[Faint handwritten text in Arabic script, likely a draft or a copy of the typed text.]













Telegram I.F.O.1927-1930.

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, Persian Gulf, H.M.S. Fowey, Bushire
Radio.

No. 123.

Dated the 4th April 1934.

Not repeated anywhere. 103

Your telegram T/74 dated 25th March.


Have had several long discussions with Shaikh with
following result:


(a) Shaikh perfectly willing to abandon all claims other than personal loan, if only he can be given some sort of general assurance ~~raising~~ by His Majesty's Government that negotiations with Bin Saud regarding raising of Blockade will be pressed to successful conclusion, and that Bin Saud will be compelled to adhere to terms of any agreement arrived at.


(b) Shaikh utterly distrusts Bin Saud and believes him capable of making any promises to His Majesty's Government (even to agreeing to Kuwait's conditions of customs posts on frontier) with no intention of carrying them out. For instance he may declare blockade raised but if there is no good will and he secretly prevents his subjects from coming up to Kuwait to buy goods, the position is the same as before. Kuwait being sellers not carriers.

(c) In short Shaikh while most anxious not to appear unreasonable fears that he may find himself in position of having signed away his just claims and in end have nothing to show for it owing to His Majesty's Government's reluctance to press Bin Saud too hard.

-Political-









W
12.4.34

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107

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
Department.
EXPRESS LETTER (AIR MAIL).

[N.B.—This is an ORIGINAL message sent by AIR MAIL which provides a means of communication more expeditious than the ordinary mail and is cheaper than the telegraph. It is intended to be treated, on receipt, with the same expedition as if it had been telegraphed. To save time and to obviate formalities it is drafted in the form of a telegram. It is authenticated by the signature of a responsible officer of the Department.]

No. 6/186 of 1934 Dated 7th April, 1934. Office of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Camp, Bahrein.

To
From - Political Resident at Bahrain.
To - Secretary of State for India, London.
Repeated Government of India, New Delhi.
Reference your H.M.'s Minister, Jeddah.
Political Agent, Kuwait. ✓

WITH COPY OF TELEGRAM REFERRED TO.

Reference my telegram No. 5/103 of to-day's date.
I enclose copy of telegram No. 123, dated the 4th April 1934, from the Political Agent, Kuwait.


2. With regard to (a) of Political Agent's telegram.
As you will see, the Shaikh still requires an assurance from His Majesty's Government that the raising of the blockade will actually be brought about. I presume that His Majesty's Government are still of the same opinion as expressed in Colonial Office telegram No. 11, dated the 14th July 1933, and that no such assurance can be given.


3. With regard to (b). I do not see how His Majesty's Government can be made responsible for counteracting Ibn Saud's secret evasions of the blockade.


(Signature) 4./


(Designation)

S. 44.
DCFP-11248&P-(M-1314)-4-8-32-12,000.









Telegram XX.

From H.M.'s Minister, Jedda.

To H.M.'s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London, No.64.

Repeated to Government of India, Foreign and Political
Department, New Delhi, No.19.

Political Resident, Bushire. No.57.

Dated 18th received the 19th April 1934.


IMPORTANT.


India Office telegram to Government of India
No.958.


I am increasingly disturbed at possibility of two
separate conflicts with Ibn Saud over Kuwait and area east
of Blue Line. See paragraph 4 of my telegram No.40.
Atmosphere may now be clouded by latest row induced by
incident and no question can be considered without taking
account of Saudi-Yemen situation which may be developing
more rapidly than seemed likely three weeks ago. If Ibn
Saud wins the conflict with Imam in which His Majesty's
Government has done nothing material to help him he will be
encouraged to resist our claims in eastern Arabia. He may
be all the readier to do so though this is conjecture as
a result of establishment of direct contact with Arab
leaders taking part in mission of mediation now here. If
he is worsted by Imam he will think His Majesty's Govern-
ment are taking advantage of his difficulties to embark on
forward policy on eastern side of his dominions.


I realise that policy in regard to question
mentioned in first sentence cannot be altered. It occurred
to me however that appearance of double attack on Ibn Saud
might be mitigated by a preliminary communication on the
following lines if Shaikh of Kuwait abandons his pecuniary
claims:


Shaikh














Savingram XX

From H.M.'s Minister, Jeddah.

To H.M.'s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London, No. 12-Saving.
Repeated to Government of India, New Delhi. No. 4-Saving.


Political Resident, Bushire. No. 5-Saving.

Dated 14th (received 24th) April 1934.

My telegram No. 47.

Chapter on Boundaries of Saudi Arabia in work mentioned in last paragraph of my telegram No. 30 states that only fixed boundaries are those with Kuwait and 'Iraq and that between Nejd and Transjordan. His Majesty does not attempt to indicate length of approximate frontier to east and south east but states that greater part of Rub-
(corrupt) al Khali is (considered?) among dependents of Nejd as all tribes submit and pay zakat year by year to Nejd officials. He gives length of coast from south east corner of Kuwait Neutral Zone "to Qatar" as 350 miles.

-RYAN-





Telegram XX.

From H.M.'s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Londn.

To H.M.'s Minister, Jedda. No.50.

Repeated to Government of India, New Delhi.

Political Resident, Bushire.

Dated 21st (received 22nd) April, 1934.

Your telegram 64.

Position is not quite as you envisage it.



Question of Kuwaiti blockade cannot be taken
up with Ibn Saud in immediate future as latest information
from Resident shows that Shaikh will not waive claims save
in return for undertaking by His Majesty's Government
to secure raising of blockade by Ibn Saud and to ensure that
such undertaking is thereafter fully implemented.


Nor can necessary preliminary understanding with
Shaikh regarding direct correspondence with Ibn Saud be
reached immediately. Question of Oil concession in Neutral
Zone is at present being amicably treated by Ibn Saud ^{and advance} ?
not involve acrimonious discussion at present stage.

On the other hand question of his Eastern boundary
will have to be broached as soon as instructions reach you
more especially since information regarding attitude of His
Majesty's Government may at any time reach him through
American channels.

These questions will therefore not be raised with
Saudi Government simultaneously and consequently need for
such a communication as you suggest, which it would in fact
be impossible to make for some considerable time, does not
appear to arise.

-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS-





Translation of letter No.796, dated the 23rd
Dhil Hujjah 1352 (8/4/34), from His Majesty King 'Abdul
'Aziz bin Sa'ud, Mecca, to His Excellency Shaikh Sir Ahmad
al-Jabir as-Sabah, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Ruler of Kuwait.

---oOo---


After compliments,


With the hand of pleasure We have received your
letter No.R3/1453, dated the 28th Dhil Qa'dah 1352 (14/3/34)
and fully understood what you stated therein as regards the
tranquil state of affairs prevailing, which gave us great
pleasure.

By the grace of God we are in the best of health
and our news pleases you in every way. Thanks be to God
for His amny Kind favours. May He continue them and grant
us ability to thank Him for same.

Usual ending.

---oOo---






Translation of Mulhaq to letter No.796, dated
the 23rd Dhil Hujjah 1352 (8/4/34), from His Majesty King
Bin Sa'ud, to His Excellency the Ruler of Kuwait.


---oOo---

May God protect you,

With regard to the news of Yamen, the situation
continues as We have explained to you in our telegrams.
With the help of God the result will be satisfactory to
Muslims. May God direct both you and us to what is good
for this world and the next.

---oOo---





R.I.513.
18.6.34.

Telegram I.F.O.1927.
From Political Agent, Bahrain.
To Political Agent, Kuwait.
No. 600.
Dated the 15th June 1934.

Hassa rumour states Bin Saud has ordered fort
to be built at Hafar al Batin.

Copy handed to Resident, Persian Gulf.

-Political-

H.C.

Type out and show to Major Watts.

Id.H.D.(ickson)

Telegram I.F.O.1927.
From Political Agent, Kuwait.
To Political Agent, Bahrain.
No. 214.
Dated the 16th June 1934.

Your telegram No.600.

Same rumour reached here week ago with addition
that move was preliminary to Bin Saud establishing string
of Customs posts and raising Kuwait blockade as soon as
Yemen trouble over. Rumour should be treated with caution.

-Political-


H.C.



Give number and issue. Afterwards type and show to
Major Watts.


Id. H.D.(ickson).


P.A.


Submitted to your personal knowledge.
H.D. (ickson) P.A.















indicated, are prepared to press matter with Ibn Saud.


On the other hand, impasse has now been reached with His Majesty owing to private correspondence conducted by the Sheikh direct with the King without the knowledge of His Majesty's Government. While the Sheikh contests Ibn Saud's interpretation of that correspondence, he has been reluctant to pursue matter with Ibn Saud and latter refused to pursue negotiations on ground that presentation of claims "shows clear disregard by Koweit of international agreements and it is no use considering further agreements if such agreements are not respected". Responsibility for delay does not, therefore, in these circumstances rest with His Majesty's Government. It is clear, moreover, that unless Sheikh is either now or in the future prepared to contest interpretation of correspondence in question position of his claims, save possibly personal loan, must be regarded as hopelessly compromised.


His Majesty's Government in these circumstances feel that in Sheikh's own interests it is essential to dispose of question of claims. They would propose therefore to inform Ibn Saud that while Sheikh does not agree with his interpretation of earlier correspondence he does not wish to contest matter with him and is prepared to drop claims other than personal loan. His Majesty's Government would thereafter endeavour to secure satisfactory settlement on basis of Sheikh's own proposals for establishment of customs posts.

3. Unless you see objection to action on these lines or can suggest any alternative (in which case we should be glad of telegraphic report) we suggest that matter might be discussed by you with Sheikh before you proceed on

leave/














R.No. 12.7.34.
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
Department.
(123)
EXPRESS LETTER (AIR MAIL).
[NB.—This is an ORIGINAL message sent by AIR MAIL which provides a means of communication more expeditious than the ordinary mail and is cheaper than the telegraph. It is intended to be treated, on receipt, with the same expedition as if it had been telegraphed. To save time and to obviate formalities it is drafted in the form of a telegram. It is authenticated by the signature of a responsible officer of the Department.]
No. 614-S of 1934. Bushire,
Dated ~~SECRET~~ the 2nd July, 1934.
In
From - Political Resident, Bushire.
To - Secretary of State for India, London.
Repeated to Government of India, Simla.
~~SECRET~~ Political Agent, Kuwait.
Reference correspondence ending with my telegram
No. 600 of 2nd July 1934.
2. Matter has been fully discussed with Shaikh in the past by myself and Political Agent and something final in writing is in my opinion now required from Shaikh.
3. I suggest that Political Agent should write to the Shaikh on the following lines.
If the Shaikh drops
(a) demand for assurance referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of letter of 7th April which His Majesty's Government are definitely unable to give him and
(b) all claims against Ibn Saud other than personal vide last part of paragraph 2 of your Express Letter No. P.L. 3919/34, of 22nd June 1934,
His Majesty's Government for their part can then, and in no other circumstances, endeavour to secure satisfactory settlement/
(Signature)
(Designation)
S. 44.
DCFP-11248&P--(M-1314)-4-8-32-12,000.













CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 684-S of 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL
Kuwait Receipt
No. 597 Date 18.7.34.

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Political Agent, Bahrain.
2. The Political Agent, Kuwait. ✓

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s), for information.


British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.


Dated 18th July 1934.


Reference to previous correspondence :


Description of Enclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
1. Telegram No. 29 dated the 10th July 1934 from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.	Relations between His Majesty's Government and King Ibn Sa'ud.
2. Telegram No. 151 of 15th July from His Majesty's Minister, Jedda.	




















Telegram xx
From H.M.'s Minister, Jedda.
To H.M.'s Secretary of State for Foreign
 Affairs, London. No.166.
Repeated to Government of India, Simla. No.39.
 Political Resident, Bushire. No.161.
Dated the 15th (received the 16th) JULY, 1934.

Your telegram No.127.

Arrangements made under King direct for my visit to Taif show importance which he attached to it as an event of considerable importance and as an opportunity of affirming special nature of his relations with His Majesty's Government. He excelled himself in personal courtesy and attention as he expressed definite hope of receiving me in Riyadh; possibly next winter.

I had three business audiences on July 13th. King welcomed congratulations of His Majesty's Government on Saudi-Yemen settlement and their assurances regarding their attitude towards him which I described as one of unchanged friendship. I explained that settlement of certain outstanding questions would remove clouds and thereby enable the friendship to be still closer. King developed theoretical danger to 'Iraq and consequential danger to Saudi Arabia from Persian or Turkish hostility. When I sought elucidation what he finally suggested (was) that ^{Saudi} this country and 'Iraq should conclude some sort of defensive alliance under the auspices of His Majesty's Government, and that each should give formal undertaking to His Majesty's Government not to stand against them or to support any Power which might do so.

Discussion of 1913/14 Line was (omission) and to me/







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
me embarrassing as I personally consider Ibn Sa'ud's case to be strong on certain points. I could not in any case without giving grave offence use argument that his admission to family of independent and properly constituted States is a reason for his accepting undoubted validity of British legal thesis as against that stated in last note of Sa'udi Government. I emphasised confidence of His Majesty's Government in their view and difficulty they would have in pursuing matter on any other basis but intimation of readiness on their part to consider minor modifications of Line if basis were accepted. King vehemently repudiated suggestion that Turks had any locus standi to alienate his own ancestral rights, and used various subsidiary arguments which I will report on arrival in London. I suggested that question be postponed until then.


King expressed desire for settlement of Kuwait blockade question on terms of reciprocal advantage. He said cost of maintaining his own Customs posts would be greater than ^{from} ~~return~~ ^{results of the} ~~tax~~ their success seemed to favour discussion of whole (mut.) between Sa'udi Government and Kuwait representatives. As I am not sure whether Shaikh would now welcome this I did not report it by telegraph (mut.) but promised to report. King did not take up a passing reference of mine to question of Shaikh's claims.


Arising out of Kuwait question King mentioned what he called restrictions on trade of Nejd. I found that he was referring to Ahmedi incident and to alleged attitude of His Majesty's Government or Bahrain Government in preventing ships from going to his own ports. He clearly did not understand all the issues and principal features of his attitude was extreme bitterness of his personal feeling at what he represented as attempt to boycott development of Sa'udi ports. I tried to soothe him/





















Government now had two alternatives, (a) to let things drop, (b) to approach the Sheikh again on the line:-
"We are now going to approach Ibn Saud once more.
"Do you wish to raise your war claims again? If not, "we must consider them dropped". Mr. Laithwaite suggested that it was very desirable, in view not only of the positive promises which we had given to the Sheikh to assist him over this question, but of the importance of keeping him in good temper and of defending Koweit's interests against Ibn Saud, not to let the matter drop until we had taken all possible steps to persuade the Sheikh to adopt the course which we regarded as the right one in his own interests. He suggested in these circumstances that the second of the two courses might provisionally be adopted and referred to the Political Resident for comments. Colonel Fowle might have an opportunity of discussing the matter personally with the Sheikh before he came on leave next month.


Mr. Rendel considered that the matter must certainly be taken up once more with Ibn Saud as had originally been intended. It was after all a British interest that the blockade should be brought to an end even if we had to protect the Sheikh from the consequences of his own folly.


It was agreed that the India Office should prepare a draft telegram to Bushire on the foregoing lines.

For part (3) of the record, please
see E 4082/739/91

p. 134 in F. 10/9









2/739/91).

MEMORANDUM.

Record of meeting on matters affecting Kuwait.

A meeting was held on the 8th June, 1934 in Mr. Rendel's room to discuss the following matters:-

- (1) Koweit-Irak smuggling;
- (2) Ibn Saud's blockade of Koweit;
- (3) the question of direct correspondence between Ibn Saud and the Sheikh of Koweit.

The following were present:-

Mr. Rendel, }	Foreign Office.
Mr. Warner, }	
Mr. Malcolm }	
Mr. Laithwaite, }	India Office.
Mr. Crombie }	



(1) See E 3828/669/91.


(2) See E 4065/1483/25.


(3) Direct Correspondence between the Sheikh of Koweit and Ibn Saud.


Mr. Laithwaite, taking as his starting point Colonel Dickson's despatch of the 6th April (C.125) and Colonel Fowle's comments and recommendations thereon (Beshire confidential despatch No.388 - S of the 27th April) suggested that the Sheikh had made a bad mistake over his "claims" letter and might now be more careful. Mr. Laithwaite said that there seemed great force in the arguments in Colonel Fowle's despatch of the 27th April and in particular in its suggestion that the matter should be left alone for the present, until the Koweit oil question was out of the way, and that at an appropriate moment both Ibn Saud and the

Sheikh.....












- 2 -

137
140

informed on this point that His Majesty's Govt. propose to inform Ibn Saud that while Shaikh does not agree with his interpretation of earlier correspondence, he does not wish to contest matter with him and is prepared to drop claims other than personal loan. It should be made clear to Shaikh that His Majesty's Government feel it essential in his own interest to dispose of the question of claims, a decisive obstacle to the disposal of blockade question. His Majesty's Government regard his private correspondence with Ibn Saud as having made it hopeless for him to (raise) this question, save as regards personal claims, and accordingly propose to deal with question on above lines. Explanations on this point may be orally or written at the discretion of the Political Resident.

3. If you see no objection, please take action accordingly at the earliest good opportunity. It is of some urgency to clear the ground with Shaikh as matter may figure prominently in negotiations with Saudi Government after Ryan returns to Jeddah in December. In choosing moment for action however, you should also have regard to any risk there may be that effect of proposed communication on Shaikh might cause him to react unfavourably in other directions, for example the Oil negotiations.

-Secretary of State for
India-





CONFIDENTIAL. ١٥ ٧.١١.٣٤

CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
DEPARTMENT.

EXPRESS LETTER

[N. B.—This is an ORIGINAL MESSAGE, sent by post to save telegraphic expense and undue use of the wires, but intended to be treated, on receipt, with the same expedition as if it had been telegraphed. To save time and formalities it is worded and signed as if it had been so despatched.]

From - Political Resident, Bushire.

To - Political,
Kuwait.

No. 1006-S of 1934. Dated 2nd November 1934.

Secretary of State's telegram No. 2586, October 31st.
Kuwait Blockade.

2. Unless you see any objection (vide paragraph 3) please take action accordingly.

3. In order that there may be no future doubt I think that explanation referred to in paragraph 2 (c) should be given in writing. If you do not concur, let me know by telegram.

sd. T.C. Fowle,
Lieut.-Colonel.
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.



Attested.

J. Cronin
for Secretary to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

S. S.
DCFP-18658&P-(M-1811)-27 9-32-2,80,000.

Important. ١٥ ٧.١١.٣٤
Submitted H.C.
H.C.
٧.١١.٣٤

758
(141)





Telegram I.F.O.30.

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, Bushire.



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
Dated the 22nd November 1934.

Your Express Letter, No.1006-S of 2nd November.

I have not as yet taken action on Secretary of State for India's telegram No.2586 re: Kuwait Blockade as I felt time decidedly inopportune for making proposed communication, in view of Shaikh's real bitterness over recent date garden incidents and smuggling conference. As there was also chance that negotiations premature action might endanger Oil negotiations, I used my discretion and played for safety. When time comes which I hope will be soon, I see no harm in letter to Shaikh but would like preface it by personal explanation.

-Political-





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1085-S of 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL
Kuwait Receipt
No. 871 Dated 7/12/34.

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, New Delhi.
2. The Political Agent, Kuwait.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document //



British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.



Dated..24th..November..1934.


Reference to previous correspondence :



Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Political Resident's telegram No. 1124, dated the 24th November 1934.	KUWAIT BLOCKADE














Telegram G.T.C.
From Political Agent, Kuwait.
To Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 321.
Dated the 29th November 1934.

Bin Saud is hunting in Summan region 200 miles
S.W. Kuwait and has established large camp at Dahal al
Faraih due South HABA. He is accompanied by 67 cars and
all members his family except Mohamed. For information.

-Political-









CONFIDENTIAL.

D.O.No.C-325.

POLITICAL AGENCY,

KUWAIT.

The 29th November 1934.

Just a line to enclose a personal note which reached me by today's "Air Mail" from London.

2. It means, I think, that Hafith Wahba will be in Kuwait somewhere about 15th December.


3. Clearly his visit has been timed to coincide with Bin Saud's so called hunting expedition round "Dahal al Faraih" (See my telegram of today's date).

4. The Shaikh, who I saw this morning thinks that Bin Saud may possibly move up into the Gara'a region North of Safa where there are many gazelle and lots of Hubara, that is to say some 100 miles from Kuwait. He may even camp at our old friend "Khabari Wadtha" where water pools are reported to be plentiful.

5. A Kuwaiti notable, one Marzuk al Badr of Anaze stock who visited Bin Saud at Riath on 17th and returned to Kuwait on Monday night (26.11.34) told the Shaikh (this I had from the Shaikh also today) that Bin Saud talked long and late with him, about his ancient love and friendship for the Al Subah and especially for his dear Shaikh Ahmad, who from boyhood he had treated like a younger brother etc. etc. That he had been forced to blockade Kuwait against his will etc. etc., but by God if only Ahmad would pay him even a small ^{annual} amount as a sort of annual "Xmas Box" he would certainly renounce the Blockade.

6. Marzuk al Badr on the top of ^{all} this sort of ^{stuff} told the Shaikh that Bin Saud talked much about his desire to arrange a real friendly "entente" with the Arab rulers of the Persian Gulf, and hoped Ahmad would not be backward in coming forward/

The Hon'ble Lt.-Colonel T.C.Fowle, C.B.E.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
BUSHIRE.








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
forward.

7. The Shaikh opined and I agree with him that in view of the above, interesting happenings may be in the wind, and that possibly Bin Saud may sound him with "alliance" or "entente" talk shortly, and that Hafith Wahba's coming visit has all been planned some time ago.

8. The Shaikh says he is quite certain that the whole thing denotes a typical Bin Saud attempt to lead His Majesty's Government, neighbouring Arab States, and especially his own very dissatisfied tribes, away from realities, and make them think that he has come out of the Yemen War with great strength than ever, when in truth his position was most "Shaky", and his prestige internally badly impaired. The Shaikh insists that this loss of prestige is behind every thing and that Bin Saud's one aim just now is to rehabilitate himself with his own people, by leading their thoughts elsewhere. I agree with this view. It will be interesting to see what the next few weeks bring us. One thing is certain, Ahmad does not a bit anxious to see the Blockade question opened while "Oil" and "Gardens" questions are where they are now. He was very emphatic about this today.









CONFIDENTIAL. ١١/٢٨٤/٢ ١٤٧ (150)

No. 1148-S of 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL
Kuwait Receipt
No. 415 Date: 19.12.34.

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, New Delhi.
2. The Political Agent, Kuwait. ✓


and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s)/


British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE. Dated 6th December 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Telegram No. 1177 of 5th December 1934 to Secretary of State for India.	Proposed visit of Hafiz Wahba to Kuwait.
	file





Telegram R.27
From Political Resident, Bushire.
To H.M.'s Secretary of State for India,
London.
Copy by post Government of India, Foreign and Political
Department, New Delhi.
Political Agent, Kuwait.


No. 1177


Dated 5th December 1934.

Dickson has received a private letter
from Hafiz Wahba that latter is visiting Kuwait short-
ly. Can you confirm? Dickson has also re-
ceived information that 'Ibn Sa'ud may shortly move to
a hunting camp about 100 miles from Kuwait. Possibly
the two moves are not unconnected.

2. I would be grateful for previous warning
whenever possible of visits of important individuals
such as Hafiz Wahba to the Arab States of the Gulf.

Resident.





Telegram

From India Office, London.

To Political Resident, Bushire. No. 2897.

Repeated to Political Agent, Kuwait, No. 2898.

Copy by air mail to Government of India.


Dated the 7th received the 8th December 1934.


Your telegram of the 5th inst. 1177.

Hafiz Wahba left London December 4th travelling overland via Baghdad to join Ibn Saud at RIYADH. Immediately before leaving he informed Foreign Office that he was calling at Kuwait to which he understood Ibn Saud was sending cars to take him up(to Riath).

2. Your para 2, we will try to arrange this so far as possible.

-Retaxandum-








Telegram G.T.C.
From Political Agent, Kuwait.
To Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 332.
Dated the 9th December 1934.

Bin Saud returned to Riath Friday December 7th.
Above report furnished by NAFISI who just back from
Bin Saud's camp;

-Political-









CONFIDENTIAL.

No.C-344.

POLITICAL AGENCY,
KUWAIT.

Dated the 15th December 1934.

From

Lt.-Colonel H.R.P.Dickson, C.I.E.,
Political Agent, Kuwait;

To

The Hon'ble the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Bin Saud's visit to Summan.

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No.321, dated the 29th November 1934, I have the honour to forward, herewith, the undermentioned letters which His Excellency the Shaikh of Kuwait received from H.M.King Abdul Aziz al Saud, when the latter was recently camped at Dahal al Faraih in the Mutair tribal country of the "Summan". The letters were sent to me under personal note, as you will see:

- (a) Copy of personal note from H.E.the Shaikh of Kuwait to Lt.-Colonel Dickson, dated 12th December 1934.
- (b) Translation of letter No.12/58/15, dated 20th November 1934 from H.M.King Bin Saud to the Shaikh of Kuwait.
- (c) Translation of letter No.Nil, dated 7th December 1934 from H.M.King Bin Saud to the Shaikh, together with one "Mulhaq".

I have the honour to be,


Sir,


Your most obedient servant,


h

Lt.-Colonel,

Political Agent, Kuwait.









"B"

(157)

154

Translation of a letter No.12/58/15, dated the 12th Sha'ban 1353 (20.11.34) from His Majesty King Abdul Aziz bin Saud, to His Excellency the Ruler of Kuwait.


After Compliments,

We trust to God that you are as always enjoying health and happiness. Your two letters Nos.4/1757* and *1762, dated the 29th Jamad Thani and the 4th Rajab 1353, respectively, have been duly received and read with praises to God for the tranquility prevalent in your side. Please continue to write to us regularly about your health, so that we may be happy and in peace of mind in this respect. As to ourselves, we are, by the grace of God, in the best of health, and our news is nothing but tranquility. Nothing fresh has taken place worth recording. We thank God for His Many kind blessings and we pray Him to multiply them.

Usual Ending.

Political Agent's Note.

*"Personal Letters", according to the Shaikh.





"C"

Translation of a letter No. Nil, dated the
29th Sha'ban 1353 (7.12.34) from His Majesty King
Abdul Aziz bin Saud, to His Excellency the Ruler of Kuwait.



After Compliments,

We have received your esteemed letter dated the
*21st Sha'ban 1353, by the hand of our mutual friend,
Abdulla an-Nafisi, and were pleased to hear that you were
well and in good health. Your kind enquiry after your
brother's health, your warm feelings, and your friendly
expressions, all no doubt come from your well-known
generous qualities, and excellent accomplishments. Be
assured I have the same feelings in my heart for you.
It is always a pleasure to me to hear your news and
to be reassured about your precious health. As to
ourselves we are, by the grace of God, in as good health
as you no doubt hope we are. May God inspire us with
thanks worthy of His many kind blessings, and assist us
to progress in the path which He loves and approves.

Usual Ending.

*Political Agent's Note.


The Shaikh says that he wrote this, and said he was
sorry he could not run down to the Summan and see His
Majesty, as he would have liked to do, owing to pressure
of State work.








Translation of a Mulhaq to letter dated the
29th Sha'ban 1353 (7.12.34) from His Majesty King Abdul Aziz
bin Saud, to His Excellency the Ruler of Kuwait.

We have perused your Mulhaq, Brother. In fact
we are very anxious to see your cheerful face. Would that
my presence here (in Summan) had enabled me to meet with you
and enjoy the pleasure of your company. But business
has come in the way, and it must always come first. I
pray you excuse me and our meeting is no doubt destined to
take place. May God not deprive us from meeting you on
the first opportunity.









P.Z.7575/34.

Foreign Office, S.W.I.

10th December, 1934.

Dear Chancery,

You may be glad to know that the Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, the Saudi Arabian Minister in London, intends to spend about a week in Bagdad on his way to Saudi Arabia on leave.


We cannot say exactly when he will be in Bagdad, but he told Rendel he was leaving London on the 3rd December and would travel via Palestine to Bagdad, leaving Alexandria by rail on the 24th December. From Bagdad he is going to Koweit, where he hopes to see Colonel Dickson, and from Koweit he will go to Riyadh.

Yours ever,

Eastern Department.

Chancery,
British Embassy,
Bagdad.

Free
He should arrive Kuwait -
about 5th January 1935
19.12





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1176-S of 1934

CONFIDENTIAL
Form 4 Receipt
No. 840 Dated 25.12.34

156
(162)

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India,
New Delhi.
2. The Political Agent, Kuwait. ✓

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated 11th December 1934


Reference to previous correspondence:


Residency Printed Letter No. 1148-S, dated 6th December 1934.



Description of Enclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
Political Resident's telegram No. 1212, dated 11th December 1934.	Movements of Ibn Sa'ud

File 15









CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1178-S of 1934.



The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

The Political Agent,
Kuwait.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (6/5)/


British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.


Dated 11th December 1934.


Reference to previous correspondence :


Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Jedda letter No.2945/196/40 of 6th November 1934 to the Foreign Office.	Saudi Royal Family.
	Five









16/9/1966

loving temperament suits the public taste more than the
Nejdi religious intolerance to which they have been accustomed.
Saud may, moreover, have an eye on the possibility of the
demise (or abdication) of the King and may distrust the
presence of his younger brother, gradually establishing
himself more securely in the saddle, in the Hejaz, the chief
source of the wealth of Saudi Arabia. He may, also, imagine
Faysal's relations, as Minister for Foreign Affairs and after
his journeys abroad, with foreign powers to be specially
intimate; and probably has little use for Fued Hamza and may
suspect the tour of European capitals upon which he has
recently been engaged.


Faysal, I believe, has denied the report that he
goes to Riyadh to be married, and confided to his intimate
friend, Suleyman Gabil, recently that he was thoroughly fed up.

I must apologise for retelling so much gossip, but
it is, I feel, interesting and should, I think, be recorded.

For the rest, there is nothing fresh to report
about the situation at Teima; and Fued Hamza has still to
arrive back from his tour (though I gather from a recent
despatch from Baghdad that he might go over there first).

Yours ever,

(Signed) A. S. Calvert.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1180-S of 1934.

20/12

164
161
(167)

CO
TIAL
Kutub Receipt
No 842 Dated 25/12/34

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

The Political Agent,
Kuwait.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (4).

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.


12th December 1934.
Dated.....


Reference to previous correspondence:


Residency Printed Letter No.1085-S of 24th November 1934.


Description of Enclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
India Office letter No. P.Z.7210/34 of 26th November 1934 to the Foreign Office.	Kuwait Blockade.
	Free

























Telegram I.F.O.1927.

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, Bushire.

No. 2.



Dated the 5th January 1935.


HAFITH WAHBA left for Riath 2nd January. In course of a private conversation he touched on Oil and Neutral Zone and suggested that best way settle difficulty, would be for I.P.C.-Awani group and Standard Oil to each take third share in a combined Oil Concession as this would insure British control.

He showed interest in Iraq's recent anti-smuggling proposals to Shaikh which he seemed to be fully aware of. These he described as highly unjust since Iraq's obvious remedy was to introduce control measures, on the frontier, where none now existed.

H.W.discussed no business with Shaikh according to him.

-Political-







Telegram I.F.O. 1927.
From Political Agent, Kuwait.
To Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 4.
Dated the 7th January 1935.


My telegram No.2, of 5th inst.



I omitted mention that H.W. said he met Ydlibi at HAIFA and that latter stated that he was proceeding RIATH very shortly to procure letter from BIN SAUD to Shaikh of Kuwait regarding Neutral Zone. This he hoped to deliver in person.


H.W. quite voluntarily said he was against the idea of dividing Neutral Zone.

-Political-









Telegram I.F.O.1927 and 30.

From Political Resident, Bushire.

To Political Agent, Kuwait.

Repeated Secretary of State for India.

Copy sent by sea mail to Government of India.

No. 39.

Dated 9th received 10th January 1935.



Telegram from the Secretary of State, January 8th



No.62.

Kuwait Blockade.

Please take action accordingly and report by telegram
repeating to Secretary of State.

-Britconsul-





Telegram I.F.O.1927 & 30.

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, Bushire.



No. 11.



Dated the 12th January 1935.



Your telegram No.39 of 9th inst.


Shaikh has gone on hunting expedition into interior.
On his return which I anticipate will be in two days will
make necessary written communication, prefacing it by
personal explanation.

-Political-











- 2 -

ان ساداتكم وافقتم على دمن جميع
ما منى من الدعاوى كما اننا نتبين
نجد والذويت عام ١٩٣٢ .


٠٣ و نتيجة لمذاكراتنا انهي
الي ساداتكم في ٢ ابريل ١٩٣٤
مطلق رقيتمكم في ترك جميع دعايتكم
با ستثناء القرض الخاص الذي قد مستوره
لا بن سمود بمنا سبة تجرودة حايل
- على شرط ان حثومة
جسلا لمة الملك تقدم لكم تأكيد
اجمالي بالصند على المفاوضات مع
امن سمود الي تهجسة
ناجمة . وقد احبرت حثومة
جسلا لمة الملك عنما قسار
سماد تكم في حنه .

٠٤ وقد امرتني حكومة
جسلا لمة الملك الان ان احبر
سمادتك انه مطبقة الحال ليس من
المكن قطا انها تقدم لكم تأكيد
بأن مفاوضاتها مع بن سمود ستكون
ناجسة . ولكنها مستندل
احسن الصاغي للتوصل الى
حل مرض لهذه الصئلة
لا اجل ساداتكم - على امل
استراحاتكم لنا هس نقطة واحدة
او ازهد للكمارك . (اذا ^{اد} ~~استراحاتكم~~)
عليكم المفاوضات الالهية بهسن
المسدوبين الذين تمهينهم
الكومت والمطكة المربية السمودة
- معا واق على ساداتكم كما
تكتنا بكم عدد ر/ ٢٨١ المورخ في
٤ ذى الحجة ١٣٥٠ - لم تنحقي
او/

that Your Excellency had agreed to
bury all past claims as between Nejd
and Kuwait in 1932.

3. As a result of our discussions
Your Excellency on 3rd April 1934
intimated to me your entire willingness
to abandon all your "claims", with the
exception of the Personal Loan made to
Bin Sa'ud by you on the occasion of the
Hail expedition, provided that His
Majesty's Government would give you
some sort of general assurance that
the negotiations with Bin Sa'ud would
be pressed to a successful conclusion.
I duly informed His Majesty's Govern-
ment of what Your Excellency said.

4. His Majesty's Government have
now directed me to inform Your Excel-
lency that, in the nature of the case,
it is quite impossible for them to
give you an assurance that their nego-
tiations with Bin Sa'ud will be success-
ful, but that they will use their
best endeavours to secure a satisfac-
tory settlement of this question for
Your Excellency, on the basis of Your
Excellency's own proposals for the
establishment of one or more Customs
posts etc. (If preliminary negotiations
between commissioners appointed by
Kuwait and Sa'udi Arabia - this was
agreed to by Your Excellency, vide
your letter No.R-381 dated 4th Dhil
Hujjah 1350 (10.4.32) - do not
materialize/





- 3 -

materialize or prove unsuccessful.) او انها لم تنجح .

٥٥ . اما منصوص طلبات ساداتكم على ابن سمود حكومة جلالة الملك تقترح انها تحسب المذكور انه في حين ان ساداتكم لا توافقون على تأويل المرا سلطة السابقة (اي كلمتي : طلبات و دعاوى) ما كنتم لا ترغبون في منازعته في الامر وانكم مستعدون لا سقاط جميع الطلبات ما عدى القرنى العاشر المشار اليه في المباداة (٢) اعلاء .


٥٦ . علاوة على ذلك ان حكومة جلالة الملك تشعر انه من الضروري لصالح ساداتكم ترك مسئلة الطلبات بالمره . وهي التي يراها ابن سمود العقبة العاصلة لارائه مسئلة الحصار : وهي الحقيقة ان حكومة جلالة الملك تعتبر ان مرا سلطة ساداتكم الخاصة مع ابن سمود في موضوع ههنا الدعاوى هي التي سببت انقطاع الامل في بيت ساداتكم لههنا المسئلة بواسطتها - باستثناء طلباتكم الخاصة طمنا . بنسأ عليه تقترح حكومة جلالة الملك معالجة المسئلة على المحض المذكورة اعلاء .


ونعطفوا بقبول ملحق الاحترام .


Lt.-Col.,
Political Agent, Kuwait.

5. Regarding Your Excellency's "claims" against Bin Sa'ud - His Majesty's Government propose to inform the latter that while Your Excellency does not agree to the interpretation of earlier correspondence (i.e. the words Talabat and Da'awi), Your Excellency does not wish to contest the matter with him, and further, is prepared to drop all claims, with the exception of the personal loan referred to in paragraph (2) above.

6. Moreover, His Majesty's Government feel it essential in Your Excellency's own interests, that you should abandon this question of claims altogether, which in the eyes of Bin Sa'ud is a decisive obstacle to the disposal of the Blockade question: Indeed His Majesty's Government regard Your Excellency's private correspondence with Bin Sa'ud on the subject of these "claims", as having made it quite hopeless for Your Excellency to raise this question, through them, with the exception of course of your "Personal" claims: Accordingly His Majesty's Government propose to deal with the matter on the lines mentioned above.
Usual ending.









BY AIR MAIL.
CONFIDENTIAL.No.C-21.

The Political Agent at Kuwait presents his compliments to

The Foreign Secretary to the
Government of India in the
Foreign & Political Department,
NEW DELHI.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned documents.


Political Agency,
KUWAIT.


Dated the 19th January 1935.


Reference to previous correspondence.


DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Telegram No.20, dated 19th January 1935 to the Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.	<u>Kuwait BLOCKADE.</u>









CONFIDENTIAL.

No.C-24.

POLITICAL AGENCY,

KUWAIT.

The 23rd January 1935.

From

Lt.-Colonel H.R.P.Dickson, C.I.E.,
Political Agent, Kuwait;

To

The Hon'ble the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,
BUSHIRE.

Kuwait Blockade and His Majesty's Government's
proposal to reopen negotiations with H.M.King
Bin Saud.


Sir,

With reference to correspondence ending with
my telegram No.20, dated the 19th January 1935, copy of
which was sent by me to H.M's Secretary of State for India
and to the Government of India; I have the honour to
forward, for your information, the marginally noted

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Confidential Letter No.C-18, dated 18.1.35. from the
Political Agent, Kuwait to H.E.the Shaikh. | } correspon-
dence, which
has recently |
| 2. Confidential Letter No.R-4/1900, dated 20.1.35 from
H.E.the Shaikh to the Political Agent. | |
- passed between myself and His Excellency the Shaikh of
Kuwait.

2. You will note from the Shaikh's reply to my
letter (which of necessity had to be somewhat on the long
side in view of the length of time that has elapsed since
the matter was previously raised with the King of Saudi
Arabia) that he lays stress on the following points (he
was able to emphasize these even more fully in the talk
he had with me previous to the exchange of letters):-

- (a) Out of consideration for His Majesty's Government's
expressed views and proposals, he (Shaikh)
agrees to drop all his claims against Bin Saud
in the coming negotiations to be initiated by
His Majesty's Government, except for his "Personal
Loan". This, always provided, that Bin Saud






- 2 -

that Bin Saud will receive His Majesty's Government's advances in a friendly and accommodating spirit, means business, and will agree to raise the Blockade, and in place of same establish one or more customs posts on his side of the frontier.

- (b) Should however Bin Saud "harden his heart", and in spite of all efforts of His Majesty's Government, should he refuse to agree to a settlement on the above lines, then he (the Shaikh) feels bound to say now, that the situation must be considered as remaining unchanged and Kuwait "Claims" against Bin Saud (which are not his own, but those of his people) shall be exactly in the same position as they were before the negotiations started: He puts it this way as he does not wish to start a fresh dispute with the King over "Claims" and so spoil the good relations that exist.
- (c) He (the Shaikh) never had, and still has no faith whatsoever in the Blockade impasse being settled by means of selected Arab "Commissioners", but if His Majesty's Government desire to give the idea a preliminary trial, he will raise no objection, though he reiterates his previous warning that such Commissioners' efforts must from the nature of things prove abortive.
- (d) He (Shaikh) reiterates his conviction that if His Majesty's Government will seriously deal with the matter themselves, the blockade problem will be easily and satisfactorily solved. (The implication here is, that no amount of persuasive eloquence will be of any use with the King, but that/






- 3 -

that only a "firm front" will bring about the favourable reaction necessary for a settlement).

3. My own views are that the Shaikh knows fully well that he has not a ghost of a chance of ever getting money compensation for his "Claims", but that he wants to be able to justify all he does in this matter to his people. He wants to tell them in open Mejliss if necessary, something of the following nature (We must not forget that we are dealing with an almost Bedouin Democracy where relations between Ruler and ruled are personal).

"The protecting power have generously offered to reopen negotiations with Bin Saud for the removal of the Blockade. I have welcomed the idea - I have gone further and have offered to abandon all your and my just "claims" against the King, for damage and destruction caused by his Akhwan forces in the past, to prove that for our part, we are imbued with the fullest good will and are prepared to bury the past for ever. I have made the condition, however, that Bin Saud shows equal good will and genuinely attempts to meet our advance by an equal act of generosity. Should he agree to replace his Blockade by one or more customs posts on the frontier as the protecting power is going to ask him to do, then all is well - If he is not willing to meet the protecting power's proposals and rejects our advances, then all that is left for us to do is to withdraw our offer in the matter of "claims" and put our reliance in God and ask Him to recover them for us in his good time".

4. In my opinion, His Majesty's Government need not worry much at this stage about the Shaikh's "claims" proviso and attempt to safeguard himself with his people. They should go ahead, I think, and tell Bin Saud that the Shaikh is ready to show his good will by dropping the "claims",





- 4 -

"claims", which he has hitherto made as a preliminary to negotiations being opened.

5. But if negotiations showed definite signs of going wrong or of failing altogether, His Majesty's Government should then, but only then, say to the King, that they felt it would only be fair to advise the Shaikh to withdraw his offer to drop his claims on the grounds that he would find it most difficult to deal with his subjects, and explain away how it was that he had given away their chance of getting back "blood money" for relatives killed, and money compensation for looted camels, sheep, horses, and had got nothing for them in return.


I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Lt.-Colonel,
Political Agent, Kuwait.

VSS.





Copy of a confidential letter No.C-18, dated 18/1 (188)
the 18th January 1935, from the Political Agent, Kuwait,
to His Excellency the Ruler of Kuwait.


After Compliments,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency
that His Majesty's Government have informed me through
the Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf
that they have decided to reopen negotiations with His
Majesty King Bin Saud, on the subject of the Kuwait Blockade.

2. Your Excellency will recollect that at the
end of March 1934, and acting under instructions of His
Majesty's Government, I had several discussions with you
over this selfsame blockade question, and I informed you then
that His Majesty's Government could not again start
negotiations with Bin Saud, as they were ready and anxious
to do, unless Your Excellency agreed to abandon the "Claims"
which you had made against the King in respect of damage
inflicted by the Akhwan. This was because of Bin Saud's
difficult attitude in the matter, and because of his
insistence that Your Excellency had agreed to bury all
past claims as between Nejd and Kuwait in 1932.

3. As a result of our discussions Your Excellency
on 3rd April 1934 intimated to me your entire willingness
to abandon all your "claims", with the exception of the
Personal Loan made to Bin Saud by you on the occasion of the
Hail Expedition, provided that His Majesty's Government would
give you some sort of general assurance that the negotiations
with Bin Saud would be pressed to a successful conclusion.
I duly informed His Majesty's Government of what Your
Excellency said.

4. His Majesty's Government have now directed me
to inform Your Excellency that, in the nature of the case,
it is quite impossible for them to give you an assurance
that their negotiations with Bin Saud will be successful,






- 2 -

successful, but that they will use their best endeavours to secure a satisfactory settlement of this question for Your Excellency, on the basis of Your Excellency's own proposals for the establishment of one or more Customs posts etc. (If preliminary negotiations between Commissioners appointed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia - this was agreed to by Your Excellency, vide your letter No.R-381, dated 4th Dhil Hujjah 1350 (10.4.32) - do not materialize or prove unsuccessful).

5. Regarding Your Excellency's "claims " against Bin Saud: His Majesty's Government propose to inform the latter that while Your Excellency does not agree to the interpretation of earlier correspondence (i.e. the words Talabat and Da'awi), Your Excellency does not wish to contest the matter with him, and further, is prepared to drop all claims, with the exception of the personal loan referred to in paragraph (2) above.

6. Moreover, His Majesty's Government feel it essential in Your Excellency's own interests, that you should abandon this question of claims altogether, which in the eyes of Bin Saud is a decisive obstacle to the disposal of the Blockade question: Indeed His Majesty's Government regard Your Excellency's private correspondence with Bin Saud on the subject of these "claims", as having made it quite hopeless for Your Excellency to raise this question, through them, with the exception of course of Your "Personal" claims. Accordingly His Majesty's Government propose to deal with the matter on the lines mentioned above.

Usual Ending.





183
Translation of a confidential letter No.R-4/1900,
dated the 15th Shauwal 1353, corresponding to the 20th (190)
January 1935, from His Excellency the Ruler of Kuwait, to
the Political Agent, Kuwait.


After Compliments,


171
181
I have with pleasure received your letter No.C-18,
dated the 13th Shauwal 1353 (18.1.35), and have understood
your statement in respect of the information (Lit: news)
that you have received from His Majesty's Government,
through the Hon'ble the Political Resident, and of His
Majesty's Government's decision relative to the matter of
opening negotiations with His Majesty King Abdul Aziz bin
Saud on the subject of the Kuwait Blockade.


In view of the lengthy discussions which have
taken place between you and myself on this selfsame question,
and in consideration of His Majesty's Government's present
proposals, I agree to abandon all past claims between Nejd
and Kuwait, with the exception of the "personal loan". This
in the event of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz bin Saud agree-
ing to raise the Blockade, and to establish one or more
customs posts on his side of the frontier. Should however
His Majesty not agree to this course, that is to say, to
raise the Blockade, then the "claims" shall remain exactly
in the same state as they have hitherto been, as I do not
wish to start a fresh dispute with His Majesty about them
now.

As regards the question of the commissioners dealt
with in my reply letter No.381, dated the 4th Dhil Hujjah
1353 (10.4.32): As I have already stated their (the
commissioners') efforts to provide a settlement in such a
matter as this, must, I fear, prove abortive. But never-
theless in compliance with His Majesty's Government's
proposals, I am willing to agree on this point also, knowing
full well that no useful results will ever be derived from
their (the Commissioners') efforts.

2./









CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 83-S of 1935.

185 (192)

CONFIDENTIAL
Kuwait Receipt
No 50 Dated 26.1.35

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

The Political Agent,
Kuwait.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated 15th January 1935.


Reference to previous correspondence:


Secretary of State for India's telegram No. 2586 of 31st October 1934.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Foreign Office telegram No. 1 of 12th January 1935.	KUWAIT BLOCKADE.

Five






Telegram R 30
From H.M.'s Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, London.
To H.M.'s Minister, Jedda. No.7.
Repeated Political Resident, Bushire No.1.
Dated 12th (received 13th) January 1935.

My despatch No.438.

Political Agent, Kuwait, has now been
instructed to make to Shaikh communication authorised
in paragraphs (b) and (c) of India Office telegram No.
2584 to Bushire.

-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs-

p. 136






CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 134-S of 1935.

١١/١



The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Political Agent, Kuwait.
2. The Political Agent, Bahrain.
3. The Political Agent, Muscat.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

25th January 1935.

Dated.....

Reference to previous correspondence:


Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
1. Foreign Office telegram No.3 of 16th January 1935.	
2. Jedda telegram No.5 of 18th January 1935.	
3. Foreign Office telegram No.5 of 21st January 1935.	
4. Jedda telegram No.6 of 22nd January 1935.	SAUDI - ARABIAN
5. Jedda telegram No.7 of 22nd January 1935.	NEGOTIATIONS.
6. Jedda telegram No.8 of 22nd January 1935.	
7. Political Resident's telegram No. 102 of 23rd January 1935.	

SAUDI - ARABIAN
NEGOTIATIONS.

Register & include
again being passed
at
21.1.35

Seen file
21.1.35





Telegram xx
From Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London.
To H.M.'s Minister, Jedda. No.8.
Repeated Government of India, New Delhi.
 Political Resident, Bushire No.3.
Dated 16th (received 17th) January 1935.

Following is position regarding main questions
at issue with Saudi Government.


2. General settlement. His Majesty's Government
approve of ? conclusions of Middle East Sub-Committee meeting
of November 8th.

3. Questions of Kuwait Blockade (my telegram No.7),
of Bahrain transit dues (Government of India demi-official
letter of December 24th to India Office) and of Saudi Trans-
Jordanian frontier are still under consideration but instruc-
tions will be sent as soon as possible.

4. Slavery. Instructions sent you in my despatch
No.1052 but further instructions will follow as soon as
possible on point raised in your telegram No.4.

5. South Eastern Boundary of Saudi Arabia. After
consideration of views of Political Authorities in the
Persian Gulf and Government of India, His Majesty's Govern-
ment suggest following programme for negotiations with Saudi
Government. Concessions in each case are intended to form
part of the general settlement.

6. First stage. Request for clearer indication
of Ibn Saud's desiderata. If King merely repeats his claim
to whole desert except for coastal belt he might be told
that so vague and extensive a claim to so vast an area, to
which His Majesty's Government do not recognise him as
possessing /





-2-

189
196


possessing any valid title can form no basis for discussion and that while His Majesty's Government are prepared to make some friendly concession this can only be within reasonable limits.

7. In any preliminary conversations with Ibn Saud you may not wish to proceed beyond this stage. But I fully realise difficulties with which you may be faced and I do not desire to tie your hands unduly. Matter is mainly one of tactics as to which you are necessarily the best judge and you are therefore authorised if you consider that no settlement is likely to be attainable otherwise to proceed either with King at Riyadh or subsequently with Fuad Hamza as and when you consider it necessary or desirable to enter further stages suggested in paragraphs 8 and 9 below.

8. Second stage. Offer Ibn Saud in full sovereignty a relatively small area or strip immediately East of Blue Line as far as a line running from head of DOHAT-ES-SALWA to a point slightly south east of SAKAK (but leaving that place to Saudi Arabia) thence (leaving to Qatar and Abu Dhabi a strip of territory extending inland for no less than 25 miles to West of head of KHOR-EL-ODEID) to North Western extremity of AQAL thence due southwards via (but to west of) BANIYAN to parallel 20 degrees North whence it would gradually rejoin Violet Line.

9. If this offer proves insufficient, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider padding to it as a third stage a settlement on the lines suggested in Rendel's letter of November 7th to Mr. Laithwaite (copy in my despatch No. 436) involving creation of Desert Zone under a special regime for a period of ten or twenty years subject to re-consideration at the request of either party at the end of that time. (See also Conclusion One of Middle East Sub-Committee meeting of November 8th). Ibn Saud would maintain

in /






-3-

190
(197)

in this Zone any personal rights which he at present effectively exercises over nomadic tribes there e.g. right to levy zakat but would not possess territorial sovereignty and would therefore not be able to grant a concession. Desert Zone mut. special regime would be defined by a separate agreement. Boundaries of Desert Zone would be approximately those suggested in Rendel's letter but would exclude BANIYAN.

10. If you are eventually convinced that no satisfactory general settlement can be reached on basis even of this concession, His Majesty's Government would be prepared in the last resort and in order to secure their desiderata in other directions to offer Ibn Saud lastly full sovereignty of a part at least of Desert Area referred to in immediately preceding paragraph subject however to ? undertaking that no concession would be granted therefor by Ibn Saud except after consultation with His Majesty's Government and to concessionaires approved both by His Majesty's Government and by Saudi Government. Precise limits to be suggested for this additional area are still under consideration and further instructions on this point will reach you as soon as possible. Idea at present being explored is that part of proposed Desert Zone lying to West of meridian 52 might possibly be thus conceded to Ibn Saud. South end of this line continue ? appear to join "ring fence" line of Neutral Zone at northern end of boundary between Aden Protectorate and Sultanate of Muscat and Oman assuming latter to run inland from RAS MALIGAR mut. Ali at right angles to coast.

11. In any case however it will be important to obtain from Ibn Saud a categorical renunciation of any rights /





-4-


rights or claim to any kind of sovereignty outside frontier line suggested in paragraphs 8 or 10 or mut. "ring fence" of Desert Zone (see paragraph 5 of Rendel's letter to Mr. Laithwaite). It would also be desirable for His Majesty's Government to retain flying rights not only over Desert Zone but also over any area which might eventually be conceded to Ibn Saud under paragraph 10.

12. You will no doubt in any negotiations make such use as you can of fact that any of these concessions would involve acquisition by Ibn Saud of rights over very large areas to which he has at present no legal claim and would release him from obligations of existing "Blue Line" frontier from which he could not otherwise escape without great difficulty.

13. If you see any objection to any part of above programme I shall be glad to consider any observations you wish to offer. I trust however that present telegram will at any rate give you sufficient idea generally of desiderata of His Majesty's Government to enable you to conduct preliminary discussions with King Ibn Saud at Riyadh if you proceed there or with Fuad Hamza.

14. Instructions on such points as landing grounds and flying rights, Saudi Government Debts, etc. will follow by despatch as soon as possible.

-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs-






Telegram xx
From H.M.'s Minister, Jedda.
To Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London. No.6.
Repeated Government of India, New Delhi. No.4.
Political Resident, Bushire No.5.
Dated 18th received 9th January 1935.

Your
My telegram No.8.

Many thanks for those instructions which will certainly enable me to conduct the first round with Fuad although I must study paragraphs 8 to 11 more closely before I can submit any report by telegraph on them. Meanwhile I submit the following points in anticipation of first conversations with Fuad, who reached Mecca only yesterday and has not yet proposed a meeting.

a. I am now disinclined to go to Riyadh in the near future even if Fuad brings an invitation which latest indications make me think doubtful. Apart from reasons of practical inconvenience which have some weight but are not insurmountable, I see increasing political objections to an unofficial visit. I do not expect Fuad to renew his impossible suggestion that all the negotiations should take place at Riyadh but impression is widespread that such negotiations are impending especially in view of position as regards Treaty of Jedda. This being so, my return, without having come to any definite agreement, might be misinterpreted locally as failure and due to pressure. Moreover King feels so nervous over the Blue Line question that it would be better to confine myself to conversations with Fuad as long as possible.

I /






-2-

I propose, therefore, unless you see strong objections, to side-track any invitation, if I can do so without risk of offence, but intimate that invitation next summer would be welcome. I shall, of course, see King here in the interval.

b. What maps are you using and what maps should I use in discussion with Fuad ? Map Department of Foreign Office has, I think, list of maps available here. Further supply by bag of those to be used would be useful.

c. I appreciate the effect of distinction drawn between personal and territorial sovereignty but I am not clear as to how distinction should be defined juridically if necessity arises. May I have information on this subject, not necessarily by telegraph, if explanation is lengthy.

-RYAN-





Telegram xx
From Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London.
To H.M.'s Minister, Jedda. No.9.
Repeated Government of India, New Delhi.
Political Resident, Bushire. No.5.
Dated 21st received 22nd January 1935.

Your telegram No.6.


Sub-paragraph (a). I do not altogether understand force of your first argument against visit to Riyadh since presumably some means, e.g. suitably worded official communique, could be found to indicate that visit was intended that we should begin and not end negotiations. On the other hand local considerations must clearly be decisive. If therefore you consider it more advantageous to bring King into negotiations at the end rather than at the start and if you are satisfied that evasion or non-acceptance of his invitation will not give offence I do not wish to press you to go to Riyadh now.


2. Sub-paragraph (b). Maps found most useful for reference here are


- (a) War Office map of Asia, published in 1 to 4 million.
- (b) Hunter's two maps of Arabia.
- (c) Philby's map Rub-al-Khali.
- (d) Bertram Thomas's map of the same.
- (e) Iraq Petroleum Company's map of Qatar.


Of these you already have (b) and (c). If you do not possess or cannot obtain the rest please telegraph and I will endeavour to send copy by bag leaving January 24th. Map (e) and relevant sheets of map of (a) (revised so as to show correct position


of /













2.

above was personal and unofficial.

I gave definite official views in second conversation . I asked whether Saudi Government as such were ready to accept proposal which His Majesty's Government had (mut) approved for comprehensive negotiations on lines suggested in London last September and whether they would produce precise statement of Ibn Saud's desiderata regarding boundaries. I added that if comprehensive negotiations produce no result parties could only return to their positions in regard to legal question and expressed hope that any statement of desiderata would be such as provides reasonable basis for discussion as His Majesty's Government contemplated only moderate concession. I said I was making these observations under instructions.

Fuad (mut.) postponed his reply.


Nothing was said about invitation to Riyadh.


My general impression is that Saudi Government attach little importance to distinction between comprehensive negotiations and alternative of dealing with every question on its merits.


My present object is to tie them down to former in the first instance but I propose to play for time until I have your instructions on all points and then to suggest definite agenda. In the meantime (mut) agree to comprehensive negotiations.


Fuad's talk about Arab independence may be important if King is allowing himself to be swayed by ideas of pan Arabism e.g. in the form of Federation of Arab States which he might hope to dominate. It need not be taken more seriously than that at this stage.


Record











اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/arabic/archive/81055/vdc_100037551404.0x000016



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 148-S of 1935. I/1

4.1.35

R.I. No. 75

4.2.35.

202

(207)

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.
2. The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, New Delhi.
3. His Majesty's Minister, Jedda.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated 29th January 1935.

Reference to previous correspondence:


To (1) & (3) only. Political Resident's telegram No. 124 of 29th January 1935.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
1. Letter No. C-24 of 23rd January 1935 from the Political Agent, Kuwait, with enclosures.	177
2. Political Resident's telegram No. 124 of 29th January 1935.	177

Copy, with copy of enclosure No. 2, forwarded, with compliments, to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information.

202





Telegram XX,
From Political Resident, Bushire.
To H.M.'s Secretary of State for India,
London.
Repeated to H.M.'s Minister, Jedda.
Copy by post Government of India, Foreign and Political
Department, New Delhi.
Political Agent, Kuwait.

No. 124

Dated 29th January 1935.


Correspondence ending with Kuwait
telegram of 19th January, No. 20. Kuwait Claims.

Shaikh has replied in writing that
he is prepared to forego claims (with exception of
personal loan on condition that Ibn Sa'ud agrees to
raise blockade and substitute customs control. If
Ibn Sa'ud refuses this, claims to remain in same posi-
-tion as before.

2. Dickson points out that Shaikh has no
hope whatever of realising claims but must save his face
before his own people on whose behalf as well as his own,
claims are made by making a show of asking for a quid pro
quo.

3. In these circumstances I think the best
course to pursue would be that suggested by Ryan in ~~his~~ the
concluding paragraph of his telegram of 22nd January, No. 9
to Foreign Office.

Resident.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 201-S of 1935.

I/1 H.G. 15.2.35

209

Kuwait Receipt
No. 29 Date 14.2.35

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

The Political Agent,
Kuwait.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s). for information.


British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.


p. 200
Dated 8th February 1935.


Reference to previous correspondence:
Residency Printed letter No.148-S of 29th January 1935.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Foreign Office telegram No.8 of 6th February 1935.	KUWAIT BLOCKADE.
	<i>Ref. from to see allowance. H. G. 14.2.35 Submitted Plans. H. G. 16.2.35. File w 18.2.35</i>









CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 376
78/4.

15
19.2.35

CONFIDENTIAL
Kawal: Receipt
No. 37 Dated 19.2.35

(211)

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to :-

- (1) His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.
- (2) The Foreign Secretary, to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, New Delhi.
- (3) The Political Agent, Bahrain.
- (4) The Political Agent, Kuwait. ✓

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated...16...February...1935.

Reference to previous correspondence :

this Residency Printed letter No.227, dated the 31st January 1935.


Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Printed letter No.116/40/3, dated the 15th January 1935, from His Majesty's Minister, Jeddah, to the Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, with enclosure.	Pearl-fishing concession granted by the Saudi Government to Sheykh Abdurrahman Qusabi.

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BRITISH RESIDENCY & CONSULATE GENERAL
BUSHIRE

File w.





No.116/40/3

His Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to the Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.

British Legation,
Jedda.


15th January 1935.

Reference to previous correspondence:
Jedda Printed despatch No.3264/3525/2 of
24th December 1934.

Description of enclosure.

Name and date.	Subject
To D.O.T. O.T.2 of 15/1/35.	Qusaibi's pearl-fishing concession.

Copy to Aden - No.115/40/3 of 15.1.35.





Q.T.2.
(114/40/3)

British Legation,
Jedda,
15th January 1935.

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No.O.T.53 (3262/3525/2) of the 24th December last, relative to the concession recently granted by the Saudi Government for pearl-fishing to Sheykh 'Abdurrahman Qusaibi, I have the honour to inform you that the latter, who left Jedda for Suez on the 9th January with the intention of visiting his brother in France, has now informed a member of my staff that the concession was for Saudi waters in the Red Sea only and not for the Persian Gulf. Sheykh Abdurrahman's language before leaving, however, would suggest that he has little hope of pursuing his Red Sea enterprise, even in Farsan waters where the chances of success, given favourable conditions, seemed the most promising as a result of the preliminary survey.


2. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Chief Commissioner, Aden and to the Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to be with the highest respect,

Sir,
humble
Your most obedient/servant,

Andrew Ryan.

The Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Department of Overseas Trade,
35, Old Queen St.,
S.W.1.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. C/14 of 1935.

2047

CONFIDENTIAL
Kuwait Receipt
No 92 Dated 2.3.35

M.H.
26-2-35

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Political Agent, Kuwait. ✓
2. The Political Agent, Bahrain.
3. The Political Agent, Muscat.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

Office of the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,
Camp, BAHRAIN.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

b.187

Dated... 22nd February 1935.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Political Resident's Printed Letter No.134-S of 25th
January 1935.

Description of Enclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
1. Jedda telegram No.20 of 9th February 1935.	
*2. Jedda telegram No.21 of 11th February 1935.	
3. Foreign Office telegram No.12 of 13th February 1935.	Anglo-Saudi
4. Foreign Office telegram No.11 of 15th February 1935.	Negotiations.
*5. Jedda telegram No.28 of 19th February 1935.	
*6. Jedda telegram No.34 of 20th February 1935.	

To(1)&(2) only.

-do-

To(1) only

To(2) only






Telegram xx
From H.M.'s Minister, Jedda.
To H.M.'s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London. No.23.
Repeated Government of India, New Delhi. No.13.
Political Resident, Bushire No.20.
Dated 9th (received 11th) February 1936.

My telegram No.7. ٦. ١٩٣٦

In further conversation on February 7th Fuad conveyed in studiously disarming language King's views that it would be preferable not to make outstanding questions subject of general negotiations but to deal with each on its merits as in the past. When conversations from which present proposal had emerged were begun last June King _____ that he could not co-ordinate general policy. His Majesty's Government had diverted course of discussion to settlement of outstanding questions. His Majesty feared that if such questions were dealt with by way of general negotiations and these failed their result would be dangerously misinterpreted.

2. After some discussion of this communication in which I took no strong line but was mildly critical, Fuad turned to question of Eastern frontiers. He asked to what form settlement of it would take. Would local Arab Rulers be in any way parties to discussion of it? He assured me that Ibn Saud had no desire to interfere between His Majesty's Government and those Rulers but said that King must consider Moslem and Arab opinion and must avoid any appearance of dis-regarding their position as Arabs.

3. I replied that His Majesty's Government had never approached matter otherwise than as a question of determining boundaries between Saudi Arabia and an area with which they and local Rulers were alone concerned. I stressed fact that
latter /



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100037551404.0x000028



-2-

latter had placed themselves in our hands as regards foreign relations.


4. Fuad said that opinion which King had in mind was very ill-informed. He suggested that settlement would be easier if Rulers could be represented in some way _____ by experts or if they would affirm their desire to be represented by His Majesty's Government.

5. In view of new turn given to whole matter by Fuad's communication I refrained from pressing him for precise statement regarding Ibn Saud's desiderata for which I had asked on January 21st.

6. I promised Fuad a communication about Kuwait but deferred it until I could study your telegram No.23 with previous correspondence. I said that I was awaiting instructions about agent for proposed local conference at Bahrain. We visualised on other questions including that of Trans-Jordanian frontier but only incidentally.

7. My own view is that proposal regarding negotiations cannot usefully be pursued any further. I do not consider now that any of the concessions contemplated in paragraphs 8 to 10 of your telegram No.8 would attract Ibn Saud sufficiently to induce him to give us satisfaction on our questions for the sake of such concessions. On the other hand Fuad was so profuse in assurances of King settling all questions as to suggest that His Majesty is nervous. This may _____ independent settlement with tribes of Kuwait and possibly other matters.

8. Concession contemplated in your telegram No.8 were intended to form _____ comprehensive settlement of outstanding questions. If these are to be dealt with separately question arises whether His Majesty's Government are still prepared to offer them. There can be no settlement if they simply /





-3-

207 (217)


simply fall back on Anglo-Turkish Conventions. Difficulty of settlement on any basis whatever is greatly increased by introduction of Arab nation factor. I have explained importance of this in my despatches Nos.17 and No.28 which should reach you about 11th and 18th February. Its _____ is enhanced by moderation of Fuad's language under King's instructions on February 7th as compared with his private expression of his own sentiments on January 20th.


9. You may prefer to shelve question. If so, I can play for stalemate but this presents disadvantage that Ibn Saud will be left with a sense of grievance and _____ as to future attitude of His Majesty's Government. Alternative is, in my opinion, to follow out _____ in your telegram No.8 and to work simultaneously but independently for termination of Kuwait blockade which is next most important outstanding question.


10. We must however be prepared for rejection of all proposed concessions not merely because of greatest of Ibn Saud's pretensions but because of his acceptance of principle that he must base his _____ action to some extent on Arab nationalist view. I have been speculating very tentatively as to possibility of a scheme based on that of _____ i.e. that His Majesty's Government is _____ an agreement between Ibn Saud Sultan of Muscat and Oman and themselves representing all Rulers from Moğalla to Qatar with express consent of those Rulers on lines of general _____:


- a. all parties to recognise each others independence.
- b. all parties to recognise for a _____ period existence of a positive zone in which none would exercise any rights of territorial sovereignty.


11. This solution may be completely impossible. I cannot say that it would be acceptable to Ibn Saud. In any case /















Telegram R 27
From Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London.
To H.M.'s Minister, Jedda. No.30.
Repeated Government of India, New Delhi. No.22.
Political Resident, Bushire. No.12.
Dated the 13th (received 20th) February 1935.

(Relayed under Bushire telegram No.206
of 20th February 1935).

Your telegram No.24.
No objection.

-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs-





Telegram xx
From Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London.
To H.M.'s Minister, Jedda. No.29.
Repeated Government of India, New Delhi. No.21.
Political Resident, Bushire. No.11
Dated 15th February 1935.

(Relayed under Bushire telegram No.205,
dated the 20th February 1935).


Your telegram No.23. *p.205*

I have no objection to your reverting to separate simultaneous settlement of outstanding points as suggested in paragraph 9 of your telegram. In that case however you will no doubt consider the possibility of following up suggestion you yourself made at the end of Middle East official Sub-Committee Meeting of November 8th, that discussion of Kuwait Blockade question should be taken first.

2. Paragraph 2 _____ your telegram. It is, I suppose, possible that Ibn Saud _____ allow Fuad his head in order to see how much he can extract from His Majesty's Government but that if His Majesty's Government reacted violently Ibn Saud will tighten rein. In any case it must be made clear to Saudi Government once for all that His Majesty's Government will not abandon their established policy in the Persian Gulf in order that Ibn Saud may play with greater effect to pan-Arab gallery of whose intelligence they hold same estimate as Fuad. If King seriously intends to press this point, negotiations on frontier question affecting Anglo-Saudi relations as a whole will arise. It is therefore essential to disabuse Fuad on this point without delay.

3. I approve generally of your language to Fuad on this question. His queries recorded in paragraph 4 mut.

of /






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
of enclosure in your despatch No.17 were impertinent. If he should again allude to promise given to Hussein (I assume he refers to McMahon ? 1916-17 correspondence) short answer is that in that correspondence His Majesty's Government expressly reserved their rights under their treaties with Arab Rulers of the Persian Gulf. These treaties have been officially communicated to Saudi Government.

4. While speaking generally in above sense with whatever degree of firmness you consider necessary to drive home main points, namely refusal of His Majesty's Government to be exploited in pan-Arab interests you may see fit to add that for their own part, as Ibn Saud is aware, His Majesty's Government have constantly been at pains to promote good relations between Arab States. It is for this reason that they attach particular importance to question of Kuwait Blockade, settlement of which they hope to negotiate with Saudi Government even if general negotiations are abandoned.

5. Scheme for general agreement proposed in paragraph 10 of your telegram under reference is being considered in connection with your despatch No.28 on which I hope to address you shortly.

-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs-





61/31 & 53/54

Telegram XX
From His Majesty's Minister, Jeddah.
To His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, No. 31
Repeated to Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, New Delhi, No. 17
Political Resident at Bahrain, No. 28
Dated 19th (received 20th February) 1935.


Your telegrams No. 23 and 730.


I have today addressed personal letter to Saud indicating in general terms two alternatives favoured by His Majesty's Government, and suggesting oral discussion with a view to overcoming difficulties which have hitherto delayed progress on those lines.

Definition of first alternative is based on my note to Saudi Government of August 19th, 1932. I have defined second as follows: " to explore possibility of agreement on one particular basis which has been suggested in the past, namely that trade across frontier should be _____ at one or more customs posts in friendly relations with the tribes of His Majesty the King to which all trade should be directed.

This second definition has presented some difficulty. I deduce from previous correspondence that solution really favoured by Shaikh is proposal for a single customs post described at (i) in paragraph 2 of Political Agent's report to the Political Resident, No. 126 of 22nd June 1933. Multiple posts were mentioned by Political Resident in the Inter-departmental Meeting

of






- 2 -

of April 28th, 1933 and again in the Shaikh's reply of August 28th, 1933 to Ibn Saud's proposal for unification of customs duties. It is clear that, if Ibn Saud decided to have several posts, Shaikh would take same measure to ensure passage of trade through them as if there were only one ?

If Faud agrees to second alternative, I presume further discussion should take place here. If so, I would propose asking him in the first instance name of place or places in which it was intended to establish posts.

I am sending by bag copy of telegram to Bagdad enquiring as to present position regarding trade between Nejd and 'Iraq. See your despatch No.313 of 1932.

- ANDREW RYAN -





CONFIDENTIAL

No. C-16 of 1935.

M.H.
26.2.35

CONFIDENTIAL
Kuwait Receipt
No. _____ Dated _____

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Political Agent, Kuwait,
2. The Political Agent, Bahrain,
3. The Political Agent, Muscat,

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

Office of the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf.

Camp, BAHRAIN.


~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
BUSHIRE
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Dated... 23rd February 1935.

Reference to previous correspondence:
Residency Printed Letter No. C-14, dated 22nd February 1935.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
(1). Jeddah telegram No. 35, dated 21st February 1935.	p 216
(2). Jeddah telegram No. 36, dated 21st February 1935.	p 219
No 2 only (3). Government of India telegram No. 474, dated 22nd February 1935.	





Telegram XX

From H.M.'s Minister, Jedda.

To H.M.'s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London. No.38.

Repeated Government of India, New Delhi. No.21.

Political Agent, Bahrain, for Political
Resident. No.35.

Dated 21st (received 22nd) February 1935.


Your telegram No.35.


Paragraph 9 of my telegram No.23 referred only to questions of Eastern frontiers and Kuwait Blockade and contemplated simultaneous negotiations not necessarily simultaneous settlement of those but I have not yet (omission) questions. My present idea is to run them more or less together without definitely linking them up and to deal with all other questions separately.

I am still anxious to give priority to Kuwait Blockade but not to the extent of making settlement of it conditional on settlement regarding Eastern frontiers lest Ibn Saud should think he was being asked to raise Kuwait. Blockade under threat that failure to do so would cause His Majesty's Government to refuse any compromise regarding frontiers.

If you approve, I suggest that His Majesty's Government should take earliest possible decision as to whether they are prepared to offer concession in regard to Eastern frontier notwithstanding Ibn Saud's refusal to bring it into a general settlement of outstanding questions. I strongly recommend this course as insistence on Blue Line would create hopeless impasse and because of doubt cast on tenability of position by your legal adviser's minutes of August 29th.

Hafiz /





-2-

Hafiz Wahba told me on February 19th that he thought King would be prepared to meet us half way as regards Eastern frontiers. He advocates settlement on basis of allocating _____ tribes and seems to think that such allocation would be as adequate as our previous division though on this point his language was vague. He admitted that Saudi pretensions regarding tribes might be excessive and suggested that experts would have nothing difficult in allocating them fairly.


Hafiz Wahba represented Kuwait Blockade question as much more difficult but assured me that customs posts would really be too ^{unpracticable} _____ and would not prevent smuggling. He urged payment in lump sum by Shaikh of Kuwait to Ibn Saud in respect of duty on goods destined for Nejd. I explained Shaikh's objection to this.


I started conversation with Fuad on February 20th by reading formal statement of text which is given in my immediately succeeding telegram. I explained that though oral it represented definite view of His Majesty's Government as telegraphed to me. Fuad copied out its exact terms. He offered no comment but presently reverted to question reproduced in paragraph 2 of my telegram No.23. I parried ^{p 205} to question adding however that I had so far no detailed instructions as position had to be reconsidered in the light of his communication of February 7th regarding King's _____ general negotiations.


It is easy enough to refuse to entertain Fuad's question on the technical ground that His Majesty's Government alone are concerned but on wider political grounds I consider it important to meet it in manner which will take some account of Arab sentiment and also to be prepared with answer to question suggested in paragraph 4 of my despatch No.28.

In my conversation with Fuad I emphasised urgency of Kuwait Blockade question and importance attached to it by

His /









Telegram:- R.

From:- His Majesty's Minister, Jedda.

To:- His Majesty's Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs. No:39.


Repeated:- Government of India. 22.

Bahrain for Political Resident. 36.

Dated:- 21st (received 22nd) February 1935.

Following is text referred to in my immediately
preceeding telegram:-

"His Majesty's Government cannot fail to be
disturbed by any attempt to cast doubt on their
position in regard to matters affecting foreign
relations of Qatar and Trucial Shaikhdoms, that
position which is result of a long historical
process is established by agreements between them
and Rulers which have been communicated to His
Majesty King Abdul Aziz. Any attempt to question
it would make a solution of the question now at
issue impossible and would seriously affect
relations between His Majesty's Government and
Sa'udi Government. At the same time they draw the
attention of Sa'udi Government to the fact that
it has been a constant object of their policy to
promote good relations among all Arab States.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 217-S of 1935.

H.K. 11/2
6.3.35

CONFIDENTIAL
Kuwait Receipt
No. 114 Dated 9.2.35

220
230

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Political Agent, Kuwait,
2. The Political Agent, Bahrain,
3. The Political Agent, Muscat.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s/)


British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated... 27th February 1935.

Reference to previous correspondence:
Residency Printed Letter No.C-16, dated 23.2.1935.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Foreign Office telegram No. 14 dated 22nd February 1935.	ANGLO-SAUDI NEGOTIATIONS B.S. file file






Telegram XX
From Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London.
To H.M.'s Minister, Jedda. No.33.
Repeated Political Resident, Bushire. No.14.
Government of India, New Delhi. No.14.
Dated 22nd (received 23rd)February 1935.

Your telegram No.23, paragraph 8.

Although idea of general settlement is no longer being pursued His Majesty's Government are still prepared to offer territorial concessions outlined in my telegram No.8. You should therefore proceed with original programme as suggested in paragraph 9 of your telegram but if possible with qualifications added in paragraph 1 of my telegram No.29.

2. I note from your despatch No.28 that you are doubtful if concession described in paragraph 8 of my telegram No.8 will satisfy Saudi Government. I fully realise this but I am quite willing that negotiations on this question should proceed slowly and that original three stage programme should be adhered to. India Office are particularly anxious that even this opening concession should not be made too easily and that fullest play should be made with each stage particularly now that general settlement is not to be attempted and His Majesty's Government will not in consequence be receiving a quid pro quo for any concession they may make in respect of Blue Line. They emphasise that discovery of oil in Dohat es Salwa region (see my despatch No.45 and Rendel's letter of February 6th) of which Saudi Government are almost certainly aware should make coastal strip more attractive acquisition than was at first appreciated even though this point cannot specifically be made with Saudi Government. I am prepared however to leave you full discretion as to best tactics to pursue.

-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs-





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 226-S of 1935.

232 222

CONFIDENTIAL
Kuwait Resident
No 115 Dated 9-3-35

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Political Agent, Kuwait. ✓
2. The Political Agent, Bahrain.
3. The Political Agent, Muscat.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated... 28th February 1935.


Reference to previous correspondence.


Political Resident's Printed Letter No.C/16 of 23rd February 1935.


Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
1. Jedda telegram No.40 of 26th February 1935.	
2. Telegram No.230 of 28th February 1935 to India Office.	Anglo-Saudi Negotiations.
3. Telegram No.232 of 28th February 1935 to India Office.	

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


Telegram xx
From Political Resident, Bushire.
To Secretary of State for India, London.
Repeated Government of India, New Delhi.
 H.M.'s Minister, Jedda.
Copy by post to Political Agent, Kuwait.
No.230
Dated the 28th February 1935.

Jedda telegram of 26th February No.42 to
Foreign Office.

Presumably arguments contained in paragraph 3
of your telegram of 15th February No.491 regarding Political
Agent and Bahrain conference, apply equally to Kuwait
conference and Dickson should be associated with it.

-Resident-






Telegram xx
From Secretary of State for India, London.
To Political Resident, at Muscat. No.491.
Repeated Government of India, New Delhi. No.492.
Political Agent, Bahrain. No.493.
H.M.'s Minister, Jedda. No.494.
Dated 15th (received 16th) February 1935.

Your telegram of 7th instant No.177. BAHRAIN
TRANSIT DUES.

2. In deference to your strongly expressed views His Majesty's Government do not press that question of re-export should be raised with Shaikh of Bahrain, at any rate at this stage, though they feel some apprehension that one result of the inevitable abandonment of the AHMEDJI policy may be to give incentive for development of port on mainland which has hitherto been lacking, while it seems open to question whether local purchase of land by Qusaibis etc. may not be explained by increasing development of Bahrain as an oil centre.

3. Subject to necessary arrangements being made with Saudi Government, conference had better therefore proceed on the lines originally contemplated, concession regarding direct shipment being made in the course of discussions. But they have always contemplated that Political Agent should be associated with conference and this still seems desirable especially in the light of latest indications of pan-Arab ambitions on the part of Ibn Saud (see Jedda telegram No.23 of February 9th to Foreign Office repeated to you, and connected correspondence).

-Secretary of State for India-





Telegram xx
From Political Resident, Bushire.
To Secretary of State for India, London.
Repeated Government of India, New Delhi.
H.M.'s Minister, Jedda.
Copy by post to Political Agent, Kuwait.
" " " " Political Agent, Bahrain.
" " " " Political Agent, Muscat.


No.232.


Dated the 28th February 1935.


Jedda telegram of 21st February No.38 to Foreign Office, penultimate paragraph.


If Arab sentiment referred to is outside Gulf then it is beyond my sphere. Arab sentiment generally of Shaikhs in Gulf towards Ibn Saud is that of respect for his prowess and fear of his designs. They regard him as the BIG BAD WOLF who but for His Majesty's Government would swallow them up and so long as they are confident of His Majesty's Government's protection the less they have to do with him the better they will be pleased.


-Resident-













Telegram I.F.O.1927.
From Political Agent, Kuwait.
To Political Resident, Bushire.
No. 63.
Dated the 2nd March 1935.


229

(239)

227

Your telegram of 29th instant, No.229.
Shaikh has for last six days been absent on distant hunting expedition in interior but is expected to arrive back on 4th March evening. On his return will convey contents your wire. My own view is that dates suggested by Minister are too early for obvious reasons. I suggest 25th March for meeting and 10th April for its termination. Will also telegraph Shaikh's views later. For your personal information, I have no faith at all in proposed meeting Commissioners.

-Political-





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 237-S of 1935.

W 6.3.35

h.h. 6.3.35

CONFIDENTIAL
Kuwait Receipt
No 116 Dated 8.3.35

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

The Political Agent,
KUWAIT.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (A):

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated... 2nd March 1935....


Reference to previous correspondence:
Residency P.L.No. 226-S, dated 28.2.1935.


Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Foreign Office telegram No. 18 dated the 28th February 1935.	KUWAIT CONFERENCE

W 7/4/35

W






Telegram xx
From Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
 London.
To H.M.'s Minister, Jedda. No.37.
Repeated Government of India, New Delhi.
 Political Resident, Bushire No.18.
Dated 28th February (received 1st March) 1936.

Your telegram No.42. b. 223

Unless Political Resident who is being asked
by India Office to telegraph direct, sees objection His
Majesty's Government agree that meeting should be at Kuwait
and as soon as possible after February 27th.

-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs-





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 249-S of 1935.

Telegram from Secretary of State for India, London.

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to Government of India, New Delhi. No. 657.

The Political Agent, Kuwait.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

His Majesty's Government agree.

Secretary of State for India.

British Consulate-General, BUSHIRE.


Dated 2nd March 1935.


Reference to previous correspondence:

Residency Printed Letter No. 226-S of 28th February 1935.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
India Office telegram No. 656 of 1st March 1935.	KUWAIT CONFERENCE.






Telegram xx
From Secretary of State for India, London.
To Political Resident, Bushire. No. 656.
Repeated Government of India, New Delhi. No. 657.
H.M.'s Minister, Jedda. No. 658.
Dated 1st (received 2nd) March 1935.

Your telegram of 28th February No. 230.
KUWAIT CONFERENCE.
His Majesty's Government agree.

Secretary of State for India-





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 250-S of 1935.

W.H. 6335 II

CONFIDENTIAL
Kuwait Receipt
No. 118 Date 9/2/35

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Political Agent, Kuwait. ✓
2. The Political Agent, Bahrain.
3. The Political Agent, Muscat.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.


2nd March 1935.
Dated.....

Reference to previous correspondence:

Residency Printed Letter No.C/16 of 23rd February 1935.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Foreign Office telegram No.17 of 28th February 1935.	Anglo-Saudi Negotiations.
	File W





Telegram xx
From Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London.
To H.M.'s Minister, Jedda. No.36.
Repeated Government of India, New Delhi.
Political Resident, Bushire No.17.
Dated 28th February (received 1st March) 1936.



Your telegram 38.


Paragraphs 1 and 2. His Majesty's Government agree to tactics proposed.

2. Paragraph 3. See my telegram No.33.

3. First necessity is to elicit some concrete proposal from Ibn Saud which will indicate extent of his claims. Hafiz Wahba's remarks suggested that he may endeavour to press for a settlement entirely on a basis of allocation of tribes. His Majesty's Government would not be able to agree to this - not the least because they might find great difficulty in rebutting the extensive claims based by Ibn Saud on payment of zakat at one time or other by individual tribes for sections of tribes. On the other hand if detailed proposals for allocation of tribes are made His Majesty's Government cannot of course refuse but to consider them. In that event you should intimate that you will refer them for instructions but add that in view of migratory character of certain tribes you are aware that His Majesty's Government regard a settlement on a territorial basis as the only one likely to be really satisfactory although they would have no objection to a subsidiary agreement if necessary to provide for allocation of any doubtful tribal elements.

4. Paragraphs 6 and 7. I approve of your language. I assume however that you mentioned only Qatar and Trucial Shaikhdoms /






-2-

Shaikhdoms because they will be mainly affected by proposed frontier settlement but your observations regarding their foreign relations apply of course equally to Kuwait and Bahrain.

5. No encouragement can be given to Saudi Government to hope that His Majesty's Government will allow direct participation of Arab Rulers in frontier negotiations. If therefore question in paragraph 2 of your telegram No.23 is pressed reply should be that eventually frontier agreement will be between His Majesty's Government and Saudi Government but that views of Arab Rulers affected by it both have been and will continue to be taken into account by His Majesty's Government who are responsible for their foreign relations. This does not necessarily apply in the case of Muscat but I hope question of coterminous frontiers with Muscat will not arise, at any rate for the present.

6. I will telegraph further regarding renunciation of rights in desert zone but you will recollect from Article 16 of Treaty of Lausanne that there is insuperable objection to a renunciation of rights without specifying that they are renounced in favour of any particular party.

-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs-





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 255-S. of 1935. I/1

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6.5.35

W.H.K.
6.3.35

CONFIDENTIAL
Kuwait Receipt
No. 119 Dated 2.2.35

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Political Agent, Kuwait, ✓
2. The Political Agent, Bahrain,

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.


Dated 3rd March 1935.



Reference to previous correspondence:



Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
To 1 only. { Jeddah telegram No. 44, dated 28th February 1935. Ditto No. 46, dated 2nd March 1935. }	Kuwait Blockade
To 2 only. Ditto No. 47, ditto.	Bahrain Transit Dues.

File W










Telegram XX
From H.M's Minister, Jedda.
To Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London. No. 46
Repeated to Government of India, New Delhi. No. 29
Political Resident, Bushire. No. 46
Dated 2nd received 3rd March 1935.

My telegram No 44.

I sounded Fud yesterday as to ideas of his Government's arrangements. Speaking like myself without definite instructions he thought Kuwait would be a suitable place. He agreed that we should aim at a meeting soon after pilgrimage but thought his Government would ^{wish to} employ the same delegates as for Bahrain conference, which might affect date of Kuwait conference.

If Saudi Government employ high officials it might facilitate participation of Political Agent as approved in India Office telegram No. 656 to Bushire.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 265-S of 1935.

250 24

CONFIDENTIAL
Kuwait Receipt
No 120 Date 9.3.35

15/6.3.35

21/11/12

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Political Agent, Bahrain.
2. The Political Agent, Kuwait. ✓

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).


British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated 4th March 1935.

Reference to previous correspondence:
To (1) only. Political Agent's telegram of 3rd March 1935.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Extracts from Personalities in Sa'udi Arabia.	
	File "B3"





Extracts from Personalities in Sa'udi Arabia.

42. Hamad Sulayman.


Under-Secretary of State for Finance, brother of 'Abdullah Sulayman, q.v. and has worked under him. Acted for him as Director-General of Finance during his relegation to Hama towards the end of 1931. Was appointed Wakil or Under-Secretary when 'Abdullah was made Wazir or full Minister in August 1932. Has been employed on missions in 'Asir, notably in November 1932, when he was sent with Khalid-al-Qarqani to investigate the differences between the Idrisi and Ibn Sa'ud's Governor. They were too late to reach the spot before the Idrisi went into open revolt, but have since been standing by in 'Asir.

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
56. Khalid Al-Hakim


A Syrian or Palestinian, said to have served as an engineer officer in the Turkish army. Has been mentioned several times since 1926 as an intermediary for the purchase of arms, etc., by Ibn Sa'ud in Europe, acting apparently as a merchant, though he has also been in the King's official employment. His dealings in respect of arms appear to have been with German firms, perhaps with Italy and with Poland, where Ibn Sa'ud placed a very large order in 1930. Reported in August 1927 to have been dismissed, from what post is not clear, but accompanied Dr. Damluji in July 1928 to take part in the still-born conference at Haifa on the Hejaz Railway. Last heard of as being in Haifa in the Sa'udi interest in connection with the proceedings of the Preparatory Committee of the proposed Arab Congress. Appears to be in with Kamil al Qassab and other exponents of the idea that Ibn Sa'ud should dominate the congress, even if it is held in Bagdad. Brother

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اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100037551404.0x000070







CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 266-S of 1935.

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H.K.
6.3.35

CONFIDENTIAL
Kuwait Receipt
No. 111 Date 6.3.35

(253)

6.3.35

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. The Political Agent, Kuwait. ✓
2. The Political Agent, Bahrain.
3. The Political Agent, Muscat.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).


British Consulate-General,
BUSHIRE.

Dated... 4th March 1935.

Reference to previous correspondence :

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Jedda telegram No. 51 of 2nd March 1935.	Anglo-Saudi Negotiations.
	File





Telegram xx
From H.M.'s Minister, Jedda.
To H.M.'s Secretary of State for Foreign
 Affairs, London. No.49.
Repeated Government of India, Foreign and Political
 Department, New Delhi. No.32.
 Political Resident, Bushire. No.51.
Dated 2nd (received 3rd) March 1935.

Your telegram No.36.

I informed Fuad March 1st that His Majesty's Government had agreed to separate handling of outstanding questions. I said that notwithstanding this separation they were prepared to deal with question of Eastern frontier on some conciliatory basis as that foreshadowed in proposal for general negotiations but if we have to moderate character of concession they contemplated. I renewed request for precise statement of Ibn Saud's desiderata. Fuad promised to consult King but could not hope to produce statement pending His Majesty's arrival in Mecca mut. eight days hence. I hinted that there was no hurry.

May I have your views on paragraph 2 of my despatch No.28 ? Assumption in paragraph 4 of your telegram under reference is correct. As regards paragraph 6 I was not thinking of legal but of political considerations the importance of which I have further stressed in my despatch No.53 of February 22nd.

- RYAN -

